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Most people do not take their disputes to lawyers and judges.
Norms, rather than laws, provide the rules of conduct; friends,
relatives, and coworkers, rather than juries, make findings of
fact; shame and ostracism, rather than imprisonment or legal
damages, punish the wrongdoer. Court is held not in a court-
house, but in homes, work places, and neighborhoods, among
networks of kin, friends, and associates. In a sufficiently close-
knit group, where norms are well defined and nonlegal sanctions
are effective, the law has little impact on behavior.
These claims are not original. The legal realists advanced
them in the 1920s and 1930s as a critique of the formalism that
then dominated legal scholarship.' Members of the law and
society movement reiterated them in the 1960s and 1970s.2 Such
claims provided the occasion, and even the philosophical basis,
for much of the empirical research conducted by legal academics
over the years.3 And it seems fair to say that most legal academ-
ics endorse them today.4 Yet these claims about the predomi-
nance of nonlegal sanctions and the relative unimportance of the
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law have a curiously muted presence in legal discourse. They
exist more as unstated qualifications to legal arguments than as
independent propositions-that is to say, most commentators
would agree that their claims apply only to the limited cases
where the law matters, but would also insist that this proposition
is obvious and not worth exploring. In short, legal academics
generally have not incorporated the realist insight into their
scholarship in an interesting way.' Why is this?
The most likely reason is that scholars have implicitly adopt-
ed what I will call an "insulation theory" of nonlegal sanctions.
This theory can be described in the following way. When nonlegal
sanctions govern certain kinds of behavior, they reduce the
influence of the law, but they do not eliminate it. It is as though
the nonlegal sanctions surround the affected individuals with a
layer of insulation: in order for the law to influence those individ-
uals, legal sanctions must be strong enough to penetrate the
inhibitive layer of nonlegal sanctions. But although nonlegal
sanctions diminish the effect of the law, they do so in a uniform
and predictable way, just as insulation keeps out cold or noise in
a uniform way. Thus, nonlegal sanctions do not present a prob-
lem for legal analysis. After one concludes that law X is the
optimal means for producing behavior Y, one might observe that
the legal sanction associated with X may need to be strengthened
in order to overcome the interference of nonlegal sanctions that
independently discourage Y. But this is hardly an interesting
point, and scholars can be forgiven for neglecting to make it in
every one of their arguments.
The problem with the insulation theory is that a law X not
only influences some behavior Y directly by applying a sanction
to it; it also modifies the dynamics of groups with an interest in
that behavior. As such groups are the sources of nonlegal sanc-
tions, the law influences the behavior Y both through the direct
application of its sanctions and through its effect on the groups
whose nonlegal sanctions influence that behavior. When one
takes account of both the direct and the group effects, the analy-
' However, valuable efforts at such incorporation include Robert 0. Ellickson, Order
Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 141-47 (Harvard 1991), and David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv L Rev 373, 391-446 (1990).
See also Lisa Bernstein, Grant Proposal, The Newest Law Merchant: Private Commercial
Law in the United States (1995) (on file with U Ch L Rev). The law and society literature
is highly empirical and offers few generalizations about the interaction between legal and
nonlegal sanctions. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 Stan
L Rev 763, 766-73 (1986).
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sis of law X's effect on behavior Y becomes considerably more
complex. The insulation metaphor fails. Nonlegal sanctions
interact with the law not in a uniform and predictable way, but
in a complicated and surprising way.
To shed light on this interaction, this Article addresses two
closely related descriptive questions.6 First, under what condi-
tions will nonlegal sanctions subvert legal rules and cause them
to produce no effect or even the opposite of the intended effect?
Second, how can the state exploit the existence of nonlegal
sanctions in order to attain its goals most effectively? The second
question gives rise to an additional, seemingly paradoxical,
query: how can the state use the law to promote cooperation that
is spontaneous, that is, not enforced by the law?
To answer these questions, the Article uses a simplified
model of group cooperation. Part I describes this model. Its
salient features are the concepts of "solidarity," "group," and
"category." "Solidarity" denotes the ability of people to cooperate
in the absence of legal sanctions. By "group," I mean a collection
of people who choose to cooperate, for example, members of a
union local. Finally, a "category" is a collection of people who
happen to share some characteristic, for example, employees, but
who do not necessarily cooperate with each other. The model
employs standard economic concepts to describe the conditions
under which cooperation is likely to occur.
Part II describes how modifications of legal rules affect
cooperative behavior. This Part introduces a tripartite typology of
legal rules, which facilitates generalization about how the law
influences groups' collective action. The model described in Part I
is used to show how each kind of legal rule undermines or pro-
motes the cooperative behavior of groups, and how, in affecting
such behavior, it influences aggregate social wealth and the
distribution of resources.
Part III applies the ideas developed in Parts I and II to case
studies, including informal business or trade groups (such as the
"kye"7), unions, religious associations, and families. It should be
' The Article does not make normative claims. Sometimes, for convenience, I state
that the state "should" do something. But the context should make clear that such a claim
is based on an assumption about what the state's goals might be in a particular context,
not on a conviction about whether those goals are proper.
' A kye is a rotating credit group formed by Korean immigrants and their descen-
dants to permit its members to save and lend money without resorting to banks. A
rotating credit group consists of approximately ten to thirty people who agree to make
periodic monetary contributions to a pot. At the end of each period, one of the members
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noted, however, that the theory also applies to other groups, such
as Indian tribes, political organizations, charitable institutions,
schools, academic departments, law reform committees, profes-
sional associations, social clubs, cliques, and neighborhood associ-
ations. Part III shows the radical implications for legal analysis
that result from attention to the influence of nonlegal sanctions;
it is thus, in the tradition of legal realism, a rebuke to those who
continue to ignore them.
The analysis yields three unintuitive, albeit preliminary,
claims. First, when groups are sufficiently cohesive, or solidary,
and pursue goals that are consistent with the state's, transfer-
ring resources to them is a more efficient method for obtaining
those goals than conventional regulation of individual action.
Second, benevolent forms of general regulation that transfer
wealth, power, or privileges to deserving segments of the popu-
lation can have perverse results. In some situations, such regula-
tions will undermine the efforts of groups that would indepen-
dently achieve the regulations' goals more effectively than the
regulations themselves. Indeed, under certain conditions, a policy
of simultaneously enacting such regulations and subsidizing
certain cooperative groups (namely, those that draw their mem-
bers from the segment of the population benefitted by the regula-
tions) produces an undesirable or indeterminate result, because
the two actions have offsetting effects on incentives to cooperate.
Finally, legal rules designed to regulate intragroup relations
reduce the group's ability to regulate its members. In fact, with
the exception of rules that deter extreme bad faith conduct, even
rules that merely duplicate the group's own norms will generally
undermine self-regulation.
The Article shows that the following propositions may be
true: enforcement of voluntary contracts does not maximize their
value to the parties; employment law and labor law undermine
each other; aggressive enforcement of criminal law weakens law-
abiding religious groups; antidiscrimination laws injure ethnic
groups; wealth transfers from the general population to unions
and trade groups increase social wealth; and welfare laws reduce
the aggregate wealth of the poor.
(determined by lottery or bidding) takes the entire pot. As a result, early takers effectively
borrow, and late takers save. This example will recur throughout the Article. See Part
III.A.
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I. A THEORY OF GROUP SOLIDARITY
People can best obtain the ends they desire in some cases by
engaging in cooperative behavior and in others by acting inde-
pendently. Suppose, for example, that an employee seeks a high-
er wage. The cooperative method is to join a union; the indepen-
dent method is to threaten to quit and take another job. Success-
ful cooperation is generally more effective than independent ac-
tion because cooperation allows people to pool resources and
divide tasks. But cooperation also involves costs, such as the cost
of coordinating multiple actors, that the independent actor does
not incur. Thus, an actor will choose cooperation over indepen-
dent action only if the increased value of the benefits-that is,
the "surplus" resulting from cooperation--exceeds the cost of
cooperation.8
Having joined a cooperative venture, the actor's calculus
changes. Depending on the incentives he faces, the actor will (1)
cooperate, (2) free ride (in other words, defect), or (3) revert to
independent action. In the labor union example, the actor will
either pay dues and participate in strikes (cooperate), pretend to
pay dues or promise to participate in strikes but then fail to do
so (defect), or quit the union and confront the employer on his
own (resume independent action). The payoff from cooperation
equals the actor's share of the cooperative surplus less the actor's
cooperation cost. The payoff from defection equals the actor's
share of the cooperative surplus less the expected cost associated
with detection and sanction, which may involve anything from
simply being denied one's share of the collective good (that is,
ostracism), to something worse, like humiliation or corporal pun-
' Consider the following matrix, which represents the choices faced by two players
(for example, employees) as to whether to cooperate (for example, unionize) or act inde-
pendently:
Cooperate
Independent
Cooperate Independent
10, 10 3, 6
6,3 4,4
It is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for cooperation (that is, for the exis-
tence of a unique Nash equilibrium at which cooperation occurs) that the payoffs when
both parties cooperate exceed the payoffs when both parties act independently. In this
case, two actors equally divide the joint surplus of 12 (total payoff if both players cooper-
ate - total payoff if both players act independently = 20 - 8). If the payoffs from coopera-
tion were, say, (2, 2), then there would be no joint surplus and no cooperation would oc-
cur.
1996]
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ishment. The payoff from independent action includes neither a
share of the cooperative surplus nor any cost of cooperation.9
Even when cooperation produces a joint surplus over inde-
pendent action, the actors often will not cooperate. As the
prisoner's dilemma shows, the problem is that each actor finds it
rational to cheat. Suppose, for example, that an employee be-
lieves that other employees will cooperate to form a union. Then,
to the extent the employee can shirk without being detected and
punished, he will do so. As a result, he will continue to receive a
share of the surplus while simultaneously avoiding the costs of
cooperation. Moreover, if the employee believes that other em-
ployees will, using the same logic, behave similarly, resulting in
no surplus being produced, then the employee has no incentive to
incur the costs of cooperation. So, whatever the other employees
do, he will not cooperate. The others, thinking similarly, will also
not cooperate."
This dilemma occurs frequently because the collective good,
by its nature, can be enjoyed by people who do not participate in
its creation. No one produces the good, therefore, because no one
has much incentive to participate in its creation. In our example,
the employees will act independently rather than embark on a
Consider the following matrix:
Cooperate Defect Independent
Cooperate
Defect
Independent
8,8 0,9
9,0 2,2
6, 6
The numbers in this matrix represent a case where the parties do better by cooper-
ating than by acting alone (joint surplus = joint payoff when both parties cooperate -joint
payoff when both parties act alone = 16 - 12 = 4). However, if one player cooperates, the
other can profit at the first player's expense by cheating. Mutual defection is assumed to
be less valuable than mutually independent action. This is because mutual defection in-
volves a costly preliminary effort to go through the forms of cooperation (in an effort to
deceive the other party). The blank payoffs reflect the fact that an independent actor does
not pretend to cooperate, so no one would try to cooperate with him or could defect
against him.
Loosely speaking, this is a two-stage game: In the first stage, if either player acts in-
dependently, the game ends with the independent-independent payoff. In the second
stage, the players, having announced a commitment to cooperation, decide whether or not
to cheat. (Although the matrix represents a two-player game, the conclusions hold also for
the n-person games that are the subject of this argument.)
"0 For discussions of the prisoner's dilemma, see Douglas G. Baird, Robert H.
Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law 33-35 (Harvard 1994); Eric
Rasmusen, Games and Information 27-37 (Blackwell 1989).
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hopeless effort to unionize. Employees will not try to deceive each
other because it is obvious to everyone that this is what everyone
will do. 1
Obviously, however, groups do solve the problem of coopera-
tion. Although a theory that explains the solution has so far
eluded social scientists,' it is clear that the solution must in-
volve the creation of mechanisms to detect and punish defec-
tors. 3 In a union, for example, members monitor each other to
ensure participation in cooperative activity and union leaders
keep records of rule infractions. Defectors face criticism by lead-
ers and members, expulsion from the union, and even ostracism
from the community. Thus, in a well functioning group, the
prisoner's dilemma either does not exist or exists only at the
margin: members (or most members) cooperate because the pay-
off from cooperation exceeds the payoff from defection (as dis-
" The two-by-two grid forming the northwest corner of the matrix in note 9 repre-
sents a prisoner's dilemma. Each player reasons: if the other cooperates, defection is
superior (9 > 8); if the other defects, defection remains superior (2 > 0). In such a game,
the outcome (defined by the dominant strategy equilibrium) is defect-defect. However,
since the game I am suggesting is a two-stage game, the players can avoid the defect-
defect outcome by choosing independent action in the first stage. They will do so since the
independent-independent payoff of 6 exceeds the defect-defect payoff of 2. Nevertheless,
the independent-independent outcome is inferior to the cooperate-cooperate outcome.
12 The literature on the issue of how rational actors cooperate is vast, and the ques-
tion is unresolved. Economic theories of cooperation predict less cooperation than actually
exists. Theories that relax some of the assumptions of the rational actor model have not
met with widespread acceptance. Nevertheless, this literature is useful. Even if it does not
accurately predict the extent of cooperation, it does help identify the conditions under
which cooperation is more likely than not to occur. Helpful contributions and surveys in-
clude Dennis C. Mueller, Public choice II: A revised edition of Public Choice 9-36 (Cam-
bridge 1989); Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emo-
tions 134-45 (Norton 1988); Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity 40-58 (Califor-
nia 1987); Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 124-41 (Basic Books 1984); Edna
Bonacich and John Modell, The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in
the Japanese American Community 24-36 (California 1980); Jon Elster, The Cement of
Society: A Study of Social Order 34-49 (Cambridge 1989); Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of
Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 22-36 (Harvard 1965); Russell
Hardin, Collective Action 38-154 (Johns Hopkins 1982); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments:
Studies in the Limitations of Rationality (Cambridge 1989); James S. Coleman, Founda-
tions of Social Theory 197-240 (Belknap 1990); Elinor Ostram, Roy Gardner, and James
Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources 319-29 (Michigan 1994); Russell
Hardin, One for All 28-32 (Princeton 1995). A recent survey of this literature can be found
in Lars Ud6hn, Twenty-Five Years with The Logic of Collective Action, 36 Acta Sociologica
239 (1993).
" For a general discussion, see Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity at 49-55 (cited
in note 12). For a model discussing ostracism, see David Hirshleifer and Eric Rasmusen, Coop-
eration in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Ostracism, 12 J Econ Beh & Org 87, 90-
103 (1989).
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counted by the expected cost of detection and punishment); in
other words, cooperation is individually rational. 4
An interesting literature discusses how people use organiza-
tional mechanisms to solve the prisoner's dilemma. This is some-
what tangential to the present topic, but a few points are worth
noting. To maximize the likelihood of detecting cheaters, groups
reduce the opportunities for private behavior (for example, with
communal living), encourage confession, facilitate gossip,15 and
assign detection responsibilities to the most effective agents.16
To maximize the cost of being punished, groups create status-
based ranks, assign sanctioning responsibilities to the most effec-
tive agents, limit membership by ethnicity, isolate themselves
geographically, require investment on entry, and prohibit
extragroup affiliations.'7 To evaluate defections properly, groups
sometimes use formal, court-like means to resolve disputes;
sometimes, they use informal means such as gossip and criticism.
Importantly, to ensure solidarity, groups must maintain a size
that produces an optimal mix of monitoring economies (which
rise in small groups) and of resources (which rise in large
14 For example, an effective mechanism for deterring defection would, by penalizing
defection with a fine of 3, transform the prisoner's dilemma in note 9 into the following:
Cooperate Defect Independent
Cooperate
Defect
Independent
8,8 0,6
6,0 -1, -1
6, 6
Cooperation now becomes the dominant strategy for both players. Given the expect-
ed payoff of 8 from cooperating, cooperation is preferable to both defection (where the pay-
offs would be 6 or -1) and independent action (where the payoff would be 6).
1" See Sally Engle Merry, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in Donald Black, ed, 1
Toward a General Theory of Social Control 271, 284-86 (Academic 1984).
16 See generally Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity at 153-56 (cited in note 12)
(discussing monitoring mechanisms).
" Id at 150-67 (discussing status ranks and monitoring agents). See also Laurence R.
Iannaccone, Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other
Collectives, 100 J Pol Econ 271, 274-76 (1992) (discussing controlling membership, isolat-
ing, and prohibiting affiliation). Communes exemplify how solidary groups maintain
discipline through monitoring and sanctioning. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Commitment
and Community: Communes and Utopias in Sociological Perspective 106-08 (Harvard
1972). Successful communes are more likely to create mechanisms for insulating members
from the outside world, such as on-site services (medical clinics, for example), uniforms,
foreign languages, restrictions on leaving the grounds, and rules for interaction with visi-
tors. Id at 92. They are also more likely to create mechanisms for monitoring and sanc-
tioning, such as regular confession, mutual and leader surveillance, and public denuncia-
tion of deviants. Id at 112.
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groups).18 Regardless of the importance of the cooperative bene-
fits, groups do not survive if they do not use these mechanisms to
solve basic problems of coordination.
Among the groups that do survive, some outlast others, in
part because' of differences in their capacities to absorb environ-
mental shocks.' A surge in unemployment, for example, de-
stroys some unions but does not destroy others. This differential
capacity comes from differences in members' incentives. In stable
groups, the average payoff from cooperation greatly exceeds the
average payoff from defection, so that relatively small decreases
in the former or increases in the latter do not produce a break-
down of cooperation. In other words, the group's members face a
large "cooperation-defection differential." A group's solidarity is a
function of the members' cooperation-defection differentials. Ev-
erything else being equal, groups whose members face relatively
large cooperation-defection differentials have more solidarity
than groups whose members face relatively small differentials.
Thus, when two groups face identical environmental fluctuations,
the more solidary group will experience fewer defections, more
loyalty, more stability, and more cooperation than the less soli-
dary (or more "atomistic") group."
" See Robert Cooter and Janet T. Landa, Personal versus Impersonal Trade: The Size
of Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 Intl Rev L & Econ 15, 17 (1984). See also Jack L.
Carr and Janet T. Landa, The Economics of Symbols, Clan Names and Religion, 12 J
Legal Stud 135, 139-42 (1983); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous
Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J Legal Stud 349,
359-61 (1981) (pointing out that ethnically homogeneous middleman groups reduce
transaction costs between members); Mark Casson, The Economics of Business Culture:
Game Theory, Transaction Costs, and Economic Performance 169-85 (Clarendon 1991);
David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in James E. Alt and Kenneth A.
Shepsle, eds, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy 90, 129-30 (1990) (As groups
grow, and the range of unforeseen contingencies increases, group dispute resolution
mechanisms become less effective.). Crowding also constrains membership size, as in the
case of club goods. See James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 Economica
1, 3-6 (1965).
'" By "environmental shocks," I mean external events that modify the payoff matrix
faced by group members.
. Consider the following matrix:
Cooperate Defect Independent
Cooperate
Defect
Independent
x, y 0,6
6,0 -1, -1
5, 5
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It is the difference between the cooperation payoff and the
defection payoff, not the absolute size of either, that motivates
cooperation. Solidarity increases even when the payoff from coop-
eration declines, so long as the payoff from defection declines
more rapidly. If an employer must pay union workers ten dollars
per hour, the closest substitute nonunion wage falls from nine
dollars per hour to eight dollars per hour, and (as is likely) the
defection payoff varies with the nonunion wage, then the coopera-
tion-defection differential for each worker-and, therefore, soli-
darity-has risen. Conversely, a decline in social hostility toward
an ethnic or religious minority may decrease solidarity even if
the cooperation payoff increases, because cooperation is no longer
necessary to enable members of the minority to obtain goods and
services that outsiders formerly denied to them (or supplied only
at a premium). Even if the payoff from cooperation increases,
solidarity declines so long as the payoff from defection increases
at a greater rate. This important point will recur.
Summing up, in thinking about solidary groups it is useful to
keep four propositions in mind. First, the cooperative surplus
stimulates group creation and causes actors to abandon indepen-
dent action. Actors obtain more benefits if cooperation succeeds
than if it fails.2' Second, cooperation always involves costs, such
as membership dues and other commitments to behave in pri-
vately costly ways (such as a commitment to participate in
strikes). Third, cooperation depends on the success of mecha-
nisms for detecting and punishing acts of free riding. Fourth,
groups use a variety of sanctions to punish defectors. The opera-
tion of mechanisms to detect and punish free riding accounts for
part of the cost of cooperation. For any given area of endeavor,
cooperation is likely to displace independent action or defection
when the cooperative surplus is high, the cooperation cost is low,
the probability of being detected and sanctioned upon defection is
high, and the severity of the sanction for defection is high."
If x = 8 and y = 8, the cooperation-defection differential faced by each player is 2. If
x = 10 and y = 9, the cooperation-defection differentials are 4 and 3. The differential mea-
sures the incentive to defect, given that the other party is expected to cooperate.
2 I take no position on whether people enjoy cooperative behavior or solidarity for its
own sake, and, thus, whether emotional fulfillment or some similar benefit should be
counted as part of the surplus. Compare Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer,
Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory 183 (California 1992)
(suggesting that participation in decision making increases the willingness to cooperate).
' This approach is similar to Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity at 49-55 (cited
in note 12).
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A few examples, greatly simplified, illustrate this model's
abstractness and applicability. Workers join unions because the
increased wages and benefits resulting from unions' bargaining
advantages exceed union dues and other cooperation costs. Un-
ions expel and otherwise punish people who refuse to pay dues,
march in picket lines, or engage in work slowdowns. People join
religious associations because the collectivity allows them to
obtain certain spiritual and material benefits that, even after
subtracting cooperation costs (for example, tithes and contribu-
tions), exceed the benefits that the members could obtain alone.
Religious associations scold, excommunicate, or at least fail to
praise people who miss services, commit sins, and violate rituals.
People form families because cooperation reduces the cost of
running a household and raising children. Families sanction
members who avoid chores or otherwise shirk responsibility.
People join trade groups-collections of people who engage in
repeat dealings with each other, as formal as trade associations
and as informal as networks of continuing contractual rela-
tions-because the transactional economies that arise from re-
peat dealing exceed the costs of group coordination. Trade groups
ostracize members who engage in unfair dealing. These illustra-
tions show how, over a broad spectrum of action, different groups
engaged in different enterprises manifest similar patterns of
behavior identified by the model.23
This model's value for legal commentators lies in what it
reveals about the law. By drawing attention to the conditions
under which solidarity flourishes, it shows how the law affects
groups' solidarity. As we shall see, different laws affect solidarity
in different ways because they modify the cooperation-defection
differentials in complex ways. The arguments are developed in
Part II.
To simplify the later analysis, it is useful first to consider
why states try to affect group behavior through law. Three an-
swers suggest themselves. First, groups, because of the prisoner's
dilemma, undersupply collective goods for their own members. A
utility-maximizing state should enact laws that stimulate the
supply of these goods, to the extent that the resulting increase in
efficiency exceeds any inefficiencies caused by the state's ac-
tions.24 Second, groups often produce negative and positive
2 Part III discusses each of these examples at much greater length.
It is possible for a solidary group to harm its members; this may occur, for exam-
ple, when (1) the members are locked into a relationship that they cannot dissolve except
1996]
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externalities with respect to nonmembers." A state committed
to utility maximization should use legal rules to promote group
activities that produce positive externalities and to suppress
group activities that produce negative externalities. Third, a
state with any other goals-for example, income redistribution,
enforcement of moral norms, transformation of individual prefer-
ences, maintenance of order, and so on-must account for the
possibility that groups will react to legal changes in unintuitive
ways, leading to perverse results.26
II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GROUP SOLIDARITY
This Part advances two main arguments about the interac-
tion between the state (with its legal sanctions) and groups (with
their nonlegal sanctions). Both arguments center on the methods
the state uses to modify the cooperation-defection differentials
faced by its citizens in different areas of life, and how these
methods impact efficiency and wealth distribution.
Before turning to the arguments, however, we must develop
a typology of rules. Three kinds of legal rules interest us. "Group-
based rules" transfer resources to (or from) groups in order to
stimulate (or weaken) their ability to cooperate. "Category-based
rules" transfer resources to (or from) the larger categories of
people from which cooperative groups draw their members. "Dis-
pute resolution rules" govern the resolution of disputes among
group members. Group-based rules include, for example, laws
at great cost, or (2) information asymmetries, strategic behavior, or other market or cogni-
tive failures prevent people from discovering the utility-decreasing nature of the group or
from changing its organization. In particular, rules that govern group behavior often lag
economic and technological change: outdated but entrenched customs cannot be overcome
by the group's imperfect governance structures, but can be, sometimes, by the state. See
Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U Pa L Rev (forthcoming
1996).
' Externalities are costs or benefits "that the voluntary actions of one or more people
impose or confer on a third party or parties without their consent." Robert Cooter and
Thomas Men, Law and Economics 45-46 (Scott, Foresman 1988). For example, the above-
market wages produced by a successful union may lead to an increase in the prices of
products. See text accompanying note 124. Likewise, the union's various programs may
bring stability to a community.
26 Thus, this analysis does not presuppose a particular conception of social value. A
group that produces collective goods for its members at the optimal level is a wealth-
maximizing institution. Consequently, a wealth-maximizing court system might seek to
mimic its rules, see Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Mer-
chant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 Intl Rev L & Econ 215, 217 (1994), and a wealth-
maximizing state might subsidize it. But, a state devoted to a broader conception of
justice-however that term is defined-would choose to mimic or subsidize groups on the
basis of their contribution to justice.
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that grant tax breaks, subsidies, and privileges to families, un-
ions, religious associations, and political organizations, as well as
laws that punish cartels and criminal conspiracies. Category-
based rules include laws that transfer resources to (or from) peo-
ple, most obviously, on the basis of their race, sex, income level,
and employment, but also, less obviously, on the basis of acts
such as theft and tax evasion. Dispute resolution rules include
the general principles of contract law (as applied to groups), as
well as laws governing spousal abuse, discrimination by unions
against their members, and conflicts that arise within religious
congregations. This tripartite conception of legal rules permits
the following arguments.
First, the state may modify the cooperation-defection differ-
ential in two ways: by transferring resources to (or from) the
group itself; and by transferring resources to (or from) people
who do not belong to the group but are in the category of people
from which the group draws its members. Group-based rules,
under certain conditions, increase (or reduce) the cooperation
payoff without affecting the payoff from defection. Category-based
rules, under certain conditions, indirectly increase (or reduce) the
defection payoff without affecting the payoff from cooperation.
However, neither group-based rules nor category-based rules
necessarily change the group's solidarity level, as either kind of
rule can raise or lower the payoffs from cooperation and defection
by the same amount.
Second, the state may modify the cooperation-defection dif-
ferential by facilitating or hindering the group's efforts to detect
and punish defections. When the group's enforcement mecha-
nisms are inferior to the court's, judicial dispute resolution rules
that supplement those mechanisms increase the group's solidari-
ty. However, when the group's enforcement mechanisms are
superior to the court's, dispute resolution rules reduce solidarity.
Assuming a goal of increasing solidarity, optimal judicial inter-
vention involves balancing the imperfections of judicial enforce-
ment against the imperfections of the group's enforcement mech-
anisms.
A. Group-Based and Category-Based Rules
Recall that a group's solidarity is a function of the coopera-
tion-defection differential faced by each member. As the differen-
tial decreases, an environmental shock is more likely to create a
prisoner's dilemma, causing the actors to defect or to revert to
independent action. This Part examines how the state can use
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legal rules to affect the size of the cooperation-defection differen-
tial and, therefore, the solidarity of groups.
The problem is complex because any particular state action
can simultaneously affect the value of cooperation, the value of
defection, and the value of independent action in a variety of
ways. For simplicity, we assume a case where a solidary group
exists, that is, each player's cooperation-defection differential is
greater than zero, and the value of cooperation exceeds the value
of independent action for each player. The state can affect the
differential by changing the value of cooperation, the value of
defection, or both. The state can raise both values by the same
amount; it can reduce both values by the same amount; it can
raise one value more than the other; and it can reduce one value
more than the other. For further simplicity, we focus on cases
where state action either raises both values or raises one while
holding the other constant. There are three interesting cases.
First, the state may seek to subsidize a group with a group-
based rule. Consider, for example, tax advantages and grants for
unions, families, religious organizations, nonprofit organizations,
and related groups; evidentiary, testamentary, and zoning privi-
leges for families; bargaining and organizing privileges for un-
ions; antitrust exemptions for certain business associations; and
protections from discrimination for members of religious groups.
One can understand these laws as attempts to raise the value of
cooperation without also raising the value of defection.
Sometimes, such group-based rules increase the cooperation-
defection differential. Consider the consequences of a tax break
for a union. The union now has more money than it had before.
It may use this extra money to improve record keeping and other
forms of monitoring, thereby increasing the probability of detect-
ing defectors and reducing the expected gain from defection. As a
result, the cooperation-defection differential increases, and so
does solidarity. The defection rate declines and the size of the
surplus increases.27
By contrast, the same rule would not affect the differential if
the individual obtained his share of the increased cooperative
surplus whether or not he defected. Suppose the union uses its
tax break to reduce dues by, say, ten dollars. This makes both
27 Consider the matrix in note 9. If the tax break raised the payoff from cooperation
by 2 (to 10), the parties would choose cooperation (union formation) over independent ac-
tion (where the payoff would be 6) at stage 1, and cooperation over defection (where the
payoff would be 9 or 2) at stage 2.
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cooperating with a union ten dollars more valuable and defecting
(by, for example, crossing a picket line) ten dollars more valu-
able, since one obtains the ten-dollar benefit (the dues reduction)
in either event. Therefore, neither the cooperation-defection dif-
ferential nor the solidarity level changes.28
As an aside, note that the state has two strategies for subsi-
dizing a group. The tax break example illustrates a subsidy to
the group's agent (presumably, its leaders). By contrast, allowing
the union members a tax deduction for their dues exemplifies a
subsidy to the cooperating actors. If the group is sufficiently
solidary, the mode of transfer makes no difference, as the group
will redistribute resources in an optimal fashion among members
or functions. The union could increase its dues by an amount
that offsets the members' tax break in order to effect a transfer
to its coffers. Where friction exists between the members and the
leadership, however, the transfer's efficiency depends on whether
group leaders generally act in the members' interests (in which
case the state should effect the transfer to the group as agency)
or generally do not (in which case the state should effect the
transfer to the members).29
Even a subsidy that successfully increases the value of the
differential in the short term may sometimes have perverse re-
sults in the long term. For example, if a group cannot restrict
membership, the subsidy will produce an increase in membership
that may offset the increase in solidarity." Or, if the subsidy is
available to multiple groups, intergroup competition for members
may offset any increase in solidarity.3
The second interesting case occurs when the state seeks to
help a category of people through category-based rules. Consider
welfare laws that transfer money to poor people,
antidiscrimination laws that transfer power or wealth to minori-
ties, and employment laws that transfer resources to employees.
One might wonder why the union would do this. Presumably, it would do so only if
it is poorly run, or if it already supplies the level of surplus that is optimal for the mem-
bers. Part III.B analyzes this question in greater detail.
' Compare Shelly Lundberg and Robert A. Pollak, Separate Spheres Bargaining and
the Marriage Market, 101 J Pol Econ 988, 998 (1993) (Child care subsidies issued to the
mother and child care subsidies issued to the father may, in the short run, produce differ-
ent distributions of wealth within a marriage.).
" In the long term, the increased membership drives up the cost of monitoring,
thereby reducing the cooperation-defection differential. For further discussion, see Part
1.C.
" For a discussion of the problems arising from intergroup competition, see Part II.C.
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In these cases, the state intends to raise the value of independent
action without also raising the value of cooperation.
Under certain conditions, category-based rules reduce the
cooperation-defection differential. A category-based rule, unlike a
group-based rule, makes defection (as well as independent action)
relatively more attractive, without necessarily increasing the
value of cooperation. For example, an antidiscrimination law
could increase the value of defection from a solidary ethnically
based economic group such as the kye (because a member has
less to lose from expulsion) without increasing the value of coop-
eration. The member has less to lose from expulsion and less to
gain from membership because the market now supplies the
credit for which he formerly depended on the group. Because the
cooperation-defection differential declines, so does the group's
solidarity, and its collective good is diminished.32
However, category-based rules sometimes have no effect on
the cooperation-defection differential or even increase it. Suppose,
for example, that the state makes a one-time transfer of one
hundred dollars to all minorities. This transfer would not affect
the solidarity of kyes, because it would increase the value of
cooperating and free riding by the same amount." Or, suppose
that the state provides free education to all minorities. This
transfer could increase the solidarity of kyes by providing a good
that complements the collective good already produced by the
kyes. People with better educations, the story goes, operate a kye
more efficiently than people with worse educations. 4 But this
kind of story is strained, and the effect is surely rare. Because
well educated Koreans would be able to interact easily with out-
2 Consider the following matrix:
Cooperate
Defect
Independent
Cooperate Defect Independent
10,10 0,9
9,0 2,2
6, 6
If a category-based rule increased the payoff from defection (and, one would assume,
the value of independent action) by 2 (for defection, from 9 or 2 to 11 or 4), the category-
based rule would create a prisoner's dilemma, thereby causing the parties to defect and
the group to dissolve. As a result, the joint outcome falls from 20 to 16.
This assumes that there are no income effects.
Similarly, an antidiscrimination law could increase the cooperative surplus of the
kye by giving members more valuable opportunities to exploit, or by allowing the kye to
interact with banks and other actors.
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side institutions, they would not have to depend on the kye, and
solidarity would probably decline.
We can restate this point in the following way. The state
uses category-based rules to produce collective goods, just as a
group uses its own rules to produce collective goods. When the
state produces a collective good that overlaps with a group's col-
lective good, the interaction will produce one of three possible
kinds of results. First, the state's collective good might be a sub-
stitute for the group's collective good, as when welfare or
antidiscrimination laws enable members independently to obtain
services that the group would otherwise provide.35 Second, the
state's collective good might be a complement of the group's col-
lective good, as when an education law enables members to pro-
duce their collective goods more efficiently. Third, the state's
collective good might not affect the group's collective good at all,
as in the example of the one-hundred-dollar transfer. Only in the
first case-where the state's collective good is a substitute for the
group's-do category-based rules reduce solidarity and, therefore,
reduce the value of the group's collective good.
The third interesting case occurs when the state simulta-
neously uses group-based and category-based rules to affect both
a category of people and groups within that category. In this
case, the rules may work at cross purposes. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the state both subsidizes kyes and enacts a new
antidiscrimination law, or both subsidizes unions and increases
employment law protections. Under plausible conditions, the
group-based transfer strengthens the group's solidarity, while the
category-based transfer weakens it. If these conditions obtain,
the combined use of group-based subsidies and category-based
transfers has no effect or an indeterminate effect on the solidari-
ty of groups, but possibly even reduces their solidarity. To be
sure, if the state transfers more to the group than to the catego-
ry, or vice versa, the stronger rule will dominate the weaker rule.
In sum, a group-based rule that subsidizes a group either
increases or does not affect the group's solidarity, depending on
the extent to which the group uses the subsidy to improve its
self-governance structures. A category-based rule that transfers
' The analysis is the same whether the state intervenes to correct a market failure
or to engage in redistribution. An efficient market has the same capacity to undermine
solidary groups as the state does. See Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity at 177 (cited
in note 12). When state intervention solves a market failure, the availability of cheaper
goods may eliminate the cooperation-defection differential without making independent
action more valuable than collective action.
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resources to a category ordinarily reduces or has no effect on, but
in rare cases increases, the solidarity of a group consisting of a
subset of that category. The result depends on the relationship
between the collective good produced by the group and the collec-
tive good produced by the category-based rule.36 The combined
use of a group-based rule and a category-based rule, where the
group is a subset of the category and the transfers are of similar
magnitudes, has either no effect or an indeterminate effect on the
group's solidarity.
1. Efficiency effects.
As the prisoner's dilemma illustrates, individuals fail to
obtain a potential cooperative surplus where, whether the other
person cooperates or not, the value of free riding for any person
exceeds the value of cooperating. 7 The failure to cooperate re-
sults in an efficiency loss to the individuals, represented by the
difference between the joint value of cooperation and the joint
value of independent action. If the group does not produce a
negative externality, the efficiency loss is also a loss to society."
The state can potentially reduce this efficiency loss-that is, solve
the prisoner's dilemma-through appropriate intervention.
The efficiency effects of group-based and category-based rules
depend on a variety of factors, but one can make the following
generalizations.
First, a group-based subsidy increases efficiency if, by reduc-
ing defection, it increases the value of the collective good by an
amount greater than any collateral efficiency losses resulting
from the taxation and administration necessary to effect the
subsidy.39 Conversely, a group-based penalty, under similar con-
' Group-based rules and category-based rules that transferred resources away from
the group or the category would have the opposite effects.
" The prisoner's dilemma implies that, for example, ethnically based trade groups
undersupply dispute resolution, families undersupply household production, unions
undersupply bargaining power, and religious groups undersupply spiritual benefits.
' If the group did produce a negative externality, then the efficiency loss associated
with the lost surplus is offset to the extent of the foregone negative externality.
Consider the following matrix:
Cooperate Defect Independent
Cooperate 8, 8 0, 9
Defect 9, 0 2, 2
Independent 6, 6
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ditions, reduces efficiency. Finally, when a group-based subsidy
or penalty raises or lowers both the value of cooperation and the
value of defection, without affecting the differential, it produces
no efficiency change except for the loss resulting from the admin-
istrative costs of the transfer.
Second, a category-based transfer in favor of a category of
people reduces efficiency if it reduces the cooperation-defection
differential by an amount sufficient, everything else being equal,
to increase defections.4" Conversely, a category-based transfer
away from a category, under similar conditions, increases effi-
ciency by reducing defections. But these effects must be balanced
against any other efficiency effects produced by the category-
based transfer. For example, if antidiscrimination laws produce
efficiency gains by increasing the pool of possible employees,41
this gain would at least partly offset, and perhaps more than
offset, any efficiency loss resulting from the laws' subversion of
ethnically based cooperative groups.
A group-based transfer of 2 to each party, conditioned on cooperation, would cause
cooperation. The parties' joint wealth would rise by 8, from 12 to 20. Because the state
took 4 away from taxpayers to support the group-based transfer, the net increase in social
wealth is 4, excluding the transfer's administrative cost and the cost produced by tax-
induced distortions; therefore, wealth increases, and the transfer is efficient, as long as
these costs equal an amount less than 4.
4 Consider the following matrix:
Cooperate Defect Independent
Cooperate
Defect
Independent
10,10 0,9
9,0 2,2
6, 6
A category-based transfer to each party, that is worth 2 but only if the parties do not
cooperate, would raise each party's payoffs from defection to 11 and 4, and the payoff from
independent action to 8. As this would cause the parties to shift from cooperation to inde-
pendent action (neither will cooperate because both know that the other will defect), their
joint wealth would fall from 20 to 16.
Whether a defector can obtain a transfer conditioned on noncooperation depends on
the nature of the transfer. For example, by providing insurance against financial misfor-
tune, welfare benefits the member of the mutual aid group who is simultaneously defect-
ing by (secretly) not paying his dues. The transfer increases the incentive to defect be-
cause the consequences of expulsion are less severe. However, if welfare is limited to
people not currently or formerly in mutual aid groups, then the transfer does not increase
the value of defection, and cooperation will still result.
", See John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U Pa L Rev 1411, 1429 (1986).
For another theory, see Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of
Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv L Rev 1003, 1078-82 (1995).
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Third, combined use of group-based transfers to groups and
category-based transfers to a category from which the group
draws its members is unlikely to promote efficiency, compared to
the use of just one kind of transfer. Suppose that a group-based
subsidy alone would increase efficiency by promoting the solidari-
ty of an efficient group. Then, the category-based rule, by reduc-
ing that group's solidarity, reduces efficiency. Now suppose that a
category-based rule alone would increase efficiency by solving
some market failure. Then, the group-based rule, by enabling
members of the category to form groups that insulate themselves
from the category-based rule, reduces efficiency.42 When the
state transfers wealth both to groups and to the categories that
contain them, it undermines its own actions and incurs adminis-
trative costs without changing behavior in the desired way.
Fourth, group-based subsidies and category-based penalties
can increase the utility of nonmembers when groups produce
positive externalities. For example, subsidization of charitable
religious groups stimulates them to increase the amount of chari-
table relief that they provide to the general public. However, this
means of preventing groups from undersupplying positive
externalities faces a complication. Even if the state can increase
the cooperation-defection differential (by subsidizing group action
or penalizing defection or independent action), it does not follow
that the externality's size will increase. If the members seek only
a certain level of collective benefit, and are already producing
that benefit, then the subsidy, by increasing the benefit level,
may cause them to reduce their level of cooperation so that they
produce only the originally desired amount. As a result, the in-
crease in the collective good's value is less than the value of the
subsidy.43 In this case, a transfer designed to increase a group's
supply of a positive externality only redistributes wealth to the
group's members.
42 Suppose, for example, that a category-based employment rule produces an efficient
labor market, and that the state also promotes unions with group-based transfers. If all
employees unionize and negotiate their own contracts with employers, these contracts
produce a market that is either less efficient than or equally efficient as the market that
would exist under a pure category-based regulation. Even in the best case, the combined
regulation creates duplicative administrative costs without producing any gains.
4" For a discussion and qualifications, see Theodore Bergstrom, Lawrence Blume, and
Hal Varian, On the Private Provision of Public Goods, 29 J Pub Econ 25, 42-43 (1986).
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2. Distributional effects.
Distributional effects are important when the state seeks to
regulate groups in a way that transfers wealth or power to a
certain category of people, such as the poor, an ethnic minority,
unskilled laborers, or inhabitants of a certain region of the coun-
try. Under the group-based approach, the state transfers wealth
to a group with the expectation that the group will efficiently
distribute the wealth among its members (or even among non-
members). Under the category-based approach, the state trans-
fers wealth or power directly to everyone in a given category.
For example, the state might alleviate poverty not (or not
only) by transferring wealth to all poor people, but also by trans-
ferring wealth to religious groups, ethnic trading groups, and
other cooperative associations whose members are poor. Or, it
might assist members of an ethnic category not (or not only) by
enacting laws that protect them against discrimination, but also
by transferring power to ethnically based groups that provide
them with economic and social opportunities.
The advantage of group-based transfers is that they allow
the state to free ride on the group's independent efforts to benefit
its members. The group's superior informational and social net-
works allow it to distribute wealth with greater precision than
the state's bureaucracy. This not only minimizes the transfer of
wealth to the nonpoor, but also deters the antisocial behavior
that transfers otherwise stimulate." Moreover, if the transfer
increases the group's efficiency and solidarity, along the lines
suggested above, it also reduces the incidence of ostracism in the
sympathetic category. A more solidary group by definition suffers
less defection than a less solidary one. The subsidized group
ostracizes fewer people and, therefore, fewer people will lose the
benefits of membership.
The disadvantage of group-based transfers lies in the state's
limited control over a solidary group. Transfers sometimes
strengthen groups that have disagreeable norms, such as racist
groups. Moreover, although a transfer is likely to redistribute
more wealth to insiders than to people whom the group has os-
tracized, the ostracized people may be in greater need precisely
because they lack the group's protection. Thus, even though
See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscio-
nability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J
Legal Stud 283, 288-89 (1995) (discussing some of the perverse incentives created by
welfare).
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group-based rules might equalize wealth among people inside
and outside a particular category, they can also cause greater
wealth inequality within the category. Such an effect is likely
when the group-based rule transfers wealth to groups within an
ethnic category characterized by larger numbers of more solidary
groups, rather than in an ethnic category characterized by small-
er numbers of less solidary groups. If policymakers are concerned
with the well-being of nonmembers of the relevant groups, then
group-based rules remain troublesome.
At first glance, this phenomenon suggests that the optimal
approach to wealth redistribution would involve a combination of
group-based and category-based transfers. The state could, for
example, subsidize kyes, on the theory that these institutions are
powerful and efficient engines for advancing the interests of Ko-
rean-Americans, while also transferring wealth to Korean-Ameri-
cans generally in order to ensure that those who do not belong to
kyes maintain an adequate standard of living.
However, as we have seen, these approaches are in tension.
If the state transfers wealth to a group (for example, only those
Korean immigrants who cooperate in kyes), it strengthens the
group at the expense of nonmembers. If, at the same time, the
state makes category-based transfers (for example, to all Korean
immigrants), it weakens the group. Taking both approaches si-
multaneously produces an indeterminate effect, as the reduction
in the cooperation-defection differential caused by the category-
based transfer offsets the increase caused by the group-based
transfer. Either the group is made better off and the ostracized
insiders are made worse off, or the category is made better off at
the expense of the group. Ironically, when simultaneously using
both approaches reduces the values of the cooperative surpluses
more than it increases the wealth of the category, the aggregate
is worse off than before.45
In light of this problem, one might conclude that the optimal
approach to redistributing wealth involves group-based rules for
" For example, consider a category consisting of some people who face the payoffs
described in the matrix in note 9 and of others who face the payoffs described in the ma-
trix in note 40. If the state transfers 1 to every person who participates in a group and 3
to every person who does not participate, each party facing the payoffs in the first matrix
would gain by 3 (they continue to engage in independent action), while each party facing
the payoffs in the second matrix would lose by 1 (their groups dissolve). Thus, if, prior to
the state action, more than three times as many people had been participating in groups
as had not, the state action, though intended to benefit everyone, reduces the aggregate
wealth of the category.
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relatively solidary groups with inoffensive and redistributional
norms, and category-based rules elsewhere. Part III illustrates
this argument by contrasting labor and employment law, subsidi-
zation of religious groups and of families and welfare law, and
trade group subsidies and antidiscrimination law. These case
studies show that the state can mitigate the tension between the
group-based and category-based approaches by picking the ap-
proach more suited to the particular social and economic condi-
tions at hand.
B. Intervening in Disputes Within Groups
When people contract with each other they face two kinds of
risks: (1) that an unforeseen or unlikely contingency will make
performance unprofitable to one or both parties, and (2) that one
party will act opportunistically in a way technically consistent
with the contract but unprofitable to the other party. Parties can
protect themselves by hiring lawyers to draft detailed contracts,
posting bonds and other forms of security, limiting the size of
their investments, and by trusting courts, despite their various
limitations, to fill gaps in contracts and punish opportunism after
the fact. But these precautions and risks are themselves costly,
and the uncertainties involved in dealing with strangers make
contracting expensive.
When members of a solidary group transact, norms and non-
legal sanctions generally resolve disputes. When contingencies
arise, norms allocate risks and specify means of resolution.
Norms also prohibit bad faith and opportunism. The importance
of maintaining a good reputation and of avoiding ostracism de-
ters improper behavior. Accordingly, insiders can dispense with
expensive formalities-lawyers, bonds, even writings-and with
the unreliable courts.46
While it might seem to follow that courts should defer to
group resolution of disputes whenever possible, this intuition is
false. Suppose, for the moment, that courts should treat all pri-
vate agreements, whether between strangers or between mem-
" For a model showing the conditions under which reputational concerns ensure
optimal contractual behavior, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach
of Contract, 26 J L & Econ 691, 699-703 (1983). See also Benjamin Klein and Keith B.
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J Pol Econ
615, 621 (1981); Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory at 100-11 (cited in note
18); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J Bus 27, 37 (1980); Jonathan
M. Karpoff and John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing
Criminal Fraud, 36 J L & Econ 757, 780-89 (1993).
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bers of a group, in a manner that maximizes their ex ante value.
If courts enforced contracts perfectly and costlessly, they should
resolve any dispute, whether arising between strangers or within
a solidary group, and one would expect all parties to seek a reme-
dy in the courts. If courts resolved disputes perfectly and
costlessly, they would allocate risks and deter opportunism in
such a way that maximized the ex ante value of whatever enter-
prise the strangers or the members of the group had chosen to
undertake.
However, because courts are costly and error prone, they
should defer to other dispute resolution mechanisms when those
mechanisms provide better ex ante incentives to cooperate.47 In
the polar case of a contract dispute between complete strangers,
generally no plausible alternative dispute resolution mechanism
exists. As long as the courts' costly and error-prone enforcement
is superior to no enforcement, as would usually be the case, the
courts should intervene by hearing the" case and deciding on the
merits whether one party violated the terms of the contract.48
By contrast, when a dispute arises between members of a
highly solidary group, the group's enforcement mechanism will
likely be superior to that of the courts. Most groups have inti-
mate knowledge about their own norms and about the facts un-
derlying the dispute. Under the pressure of the market, these
groups have also likely developed effective mechanisms for gath-
ering information and resolving disputes. In comparison to the
wealth of detail at the groups' disposal, judges and juries are
generally ignorant. Groups' superior information-gathering and
dispute-resolution abilities help explain the widespread, powerful
norms against taking disputes to courts. Referring to these ad-
vantages, some commentators argue that courts should defer to
the norms of groups.49
However, this story overlooks two complications. First, even
error-prone courts can, under certain conditions, provide optimal
7 Other dispute resolution mechanisms may be more efficient than the courts be-
cause such mechanisms make fewer errors at the same cost, or the same errors at lower
cost. I ignore the problem that parties are likely to prefer courts because states subsidize
them. Thus, even if courts make more errors at higher cost than private alternatives,
parties will prefer them so long as the subsidy offsets these losses. This problem provides
further support for judicial nonintervention in disputes arising within solidary groups.
Sometimes, even error-prone judicial enforcement can produce optimal incentives.
See Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Con-
tracts, 23 J Legal Stud 159, 174 (1994).
"' See Ellickson, Order Without Law at 254-55, 283-86 (cited in note 5) (describing
when courts should and should not defer).
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incentives to cooperate (that is, not to cheat on the contract).
This result varies with such factors as the parties' ability to
structure a contract so as to minimize the risk of dispute."0 Con-
sequently, it is possible that although the court resolves a partic-
ular kind of dispute less competently than the group, the court's
less competent ex post decisions produce better ex ante incentives
to cooperate. The importance of this phenomenon, however, is
surely limited. Even when an error-prone court produces optimal
or good incentives, the (less) error-prone group still may do the
same (because of the same phenomenon). Therefore, courts
should generally defer. Moreover, groups that recognize this
phenomenon will allow members to bring disputes to court in
those unusual cases in which courts do a better job.5
Second, although solidary groups obtain and process most
kinds of information more effectively than courts, their nonlegal
sanctions are sometimes less powerful than the courts' legal
sanctions. As a result, when the value of opportunism exceeds a
certain threshold ("high-stakes opportunism"), the opportunist
prefers cheating, even if it visits upon him the group's harshest
sanctions (such as ostracism), perhaps taking the money and
moving to a jurisdiction where the solidary group has no influ-
ence. By contrast, the courts' ability to reach distant jurisdictions
and force wrongdoers to disgorge their wrongful gains deters
such high-stakes opportunism even when the group's nonlegal
sanctions do not. Accordingly, against the group's informational
advantages, the courts often have sanctioning advantages."
Thus, the desirability of judicial intervention depends both
on the efficiency of the group's detection and sanctioning mecha-
nism and on the value of a defector's opportunity. As the quality
of the mechanism declines and the value of the opportunity rises,
judicial intervention becomes more likely to provide superior
incentives to cooperate. In cases of sufficiently high-value defec-
tion and low-level solidarity, the group cannot deter the defection
' See Hadfield, 23 J Legal Stud at 180-83 (cited in note 48).
51 For example, the diamond group allows members to sue each other over patent in-
fringement (as opposed to contract disputes), presumably because it believes patent courts
can resolve the disputes more accurately than it can. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of
the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J Legal
Stud 115, 126-27 & n 26 (1992), citing Leon Finker, Inc. v Schlussel, 469 F Supp 674 (S D
NY 1979).
" This tradeoff is stylized. As the diamond group example discussed in the previous
note illustrates, sometimes groups have worse information about norms than do courts. In
addition, sometimes groups have stronger sanctions than those available to the courts.
For example, people sometimes commit suicide after being ostracized from a group.
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anyway. The courts' (often) superior sanctioning mechanisms
may provide an adequate resolution, even if the courts' (usual)
informational disadvantages prevent a perfect one. By contrast,
in cases of relatively low-value defections from groups with rela-
tively high levels of solidarity, the courts' superior sanctions are
unnecessary, and their informational disadvantages are impor-
tant. Accordingly, in such cases, they should defer to the
group.5
3
As a general rule, when one member of a group sues another,
or when the leader, representing the group, sues a member, or
when a member sues the leader, a court should hear the case if
the dispute involves high-value stakes within a low-solidarity
group. Otherwise, it should dismiss. The fact that a group or its
leader brings a sult does not mean that the suit maximizes that
group's ex ante value. A leader can behave opportunistically with
respect to followers in the same way that a member can behave
opportunistically with respect to the group.
As a practical matter, how does the court decide that the
stakes are sufficiently large and the group sufficiently atomistic
to justify intervention? The court might start by asking (1) would
the members of the group have agreed ex ante that a court
should resolve this dispute, and, if so, (2) what is the proper
allocation of obligations, according to hypothetical consent or
some other norm of contract law. But this heuristic would not get
the court very far. No such agreement would likely appear on
paper, and, although groups sometimes have norms permitting
lawsuits for some kinds of disputes, they rarely articulate these
norms in a way that is accessible to courts. 4
A more promising approach requires courts to look at the two
relevant factors: the solidarity of the group and the value of de-
fection. Indicia of solidarity include the frequency with which
members bring disputes to court, the homogeneity of the
members' interests, the homogeneity of the members' back-
' Robert Cooter argues that courts should enforce the customs or norms of groups
that do not harm their members or produce negative externalities. See Cooter, 14 Intl Rev
L & Econ at 226-27 (cited in note 26). However, this must be qualified to take account of
groups' often superior enforcement mechanisms. The courts should refuse to enforce the
customs or norms, except when the stakes are sufficiently high.
" See note 116. Courts have long refused to enforce promises that the parties clearly
did not intend to be legally enforceable. See Panto v Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 NH
730, 547 A2d 260, 268 (1988) (Souter) (An employer can escape liability "by announcing in
the written policy [in the employment contract] that it was not an offer, or a policy
enforceable as a contractual obligation."). Compare McDonald v Mobile Coal Producing,
Inc., 820 P2d 986, 989 (Wyo 1991) (handbook disclaimers too inconspicuous to be binding).
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grounds, the effectiveness of the group's sanctioning mechanisms,
the isolation of the group, the value of nongroup activity to mem-
bers, and the extent to which the group satisfies most of the
members' needs and desires.55 The value of the opportunistic act
is likely to be "high" if changes in the environment have caused a
radical change in the difference between the values of coopera-
tion and of defection or independent action.5
Evaluating these factors involves a difficult interpretative
inquiry. But the necessary distinctions are no more difficult to
make than they are in other areas of the law. To illustrate, con-
trast a dispute between kye members over collateral require-
ments in the ordinary course of business, and the same dispute
arising in the aftermath of a riot;57 a dispute between a seller
and buyer with continuing dealings over the quality of some
goods, and a dispute over the termination of a franchise;" a
complaint in a union against a person who does not pay his dues,
and a complaint against a person who does not join a strike;
ostracism from a religious sect, and a schism in a congregation; a
battle over the allocation of household chores within a marriage,
and a battle over the allocation of property after it dissolves. In
each pair, as Part III discusses, low-stakes opportunism within a
highly solidary group occurs-and counsels against judicial inter-
vention-in the first instance, and not in the second.59
In sum, wealth-maximizing courts should defer to groups'
resolutions of internal disputes, just as courts in the administra-
See note 17; Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity at 150-67 (cited in note 12). A
sociological study provides many examples from day-to-day life in a steel mill town. See
William Kornblum, Blue Collar Community 36-37 (Chicago 1974).
' The economic literature on relational contracts overlooks the importance of the
trading group to which relational contracting partners belong, the distinction between
high-value opportunism and low-value opportunism, and the relation between the solidari-
ty of the group and the value of the opportunistic act. For example, Goetz and Scott, while
recognizing the importance of nonlegal sanctions, do not suggest that courts should try to
analyze their strength and relevance in particular disputes. See Charles J. Goetz and
Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va L Rev 1089, 1148 (1981).
5 See note 119 and accompanying text.
See Macaulay, 28 Am Soc Rev at 65-66 (cited in note 2).
Compare Charny, 104 Harv L Rev at 447-51 (cited in note 5); Robert E. Scott,
Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal L Rev 2005, 2039-46 (1987)
(enforcement mechanisms). See also Macneil's analysis of relational contracts, Ian R.
Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations 64-117
(Yale 1980), and Williamson's transaction cost economics, Oliver E. Williamson, The Eco-
nomic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 20-21, 164-66
(Free Press 1985). Compare also Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions: Spontane-
ous and Intentional Governance, 7 J L Econ & Org 159, 164-65 (Special Issue 1991)
(discussing why courts do not resolve disputes between components of a corporation).
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tive law context defer to agency determinations." Normatively,
such a deferential attitude simplifies the courts' task, while im-
proving their accuracy. A deference principle frees the courts
from having to resolve the merits of disputes once they make the
preliminary determination that a dispute involves low stakes
within a highly solidary group.6 As a descriptive matter, Part
III argues, certain areas of the law already incorporate this ap-
proach.
In the case of groups that engage in undesirable behavior,
however, courts should not use legal sanctions to promote soli-
darity. Courts should instead interfere so as to inhibit the group's
undesirable norms. Examples of such interference include laws
preventing abuse within families, discrimination within unions,
and punishment of cheaters in price-fixing schemes operated by
trade groups.62 Indeed, the state might direct courts to use rules
to redistribute wealth among group members-from husbands to
wives, for example, or among workers in a union. But, if the
group is sufficiently solidary, using legal sanctions to interfere
with its norms is unlikely to redistribute wealth. The group will
merely transfer other resources away from benefitted parties to
the other members.63
Conclusion: Implications for Contract Law. Over the last
decade, scholars, applying increasingly rigorous economic meth-
ods to the problems of contract law, have generated extremely
' This deferential attitude serves as a contractual principle, a kind of default rule for
resolving disputes. Insofar as this rule maximizes a group's solidarity, its implementation
in place of some other background rule serves as a group-based advantage. By contrast, a
dispute resolution rule under which courts intervened for the sake of some ideal or pur-
pose other than maximization of solidarity-for example, to protect spouses against abuse
or union members against discrimination-would be a category-based transfer: such a rule
would transfer wealth to a particular category of people (abused spouses or disadvantaged
union members).
6 Again, this point requires Qualification. Error-prone courts could, in some cases, re-
solve low-value disputes within highly solidary groups more effectively than could the
more competent group, because of the incentives produced by legal uncertainty. See text
accompanying notes 66-67. Further study is needed to resolve this point.
' Consider the case of Dawson v Hillsborough County, Florida School Board, 322 F
Supp 286, 304 (M D Fla 1971), where the court struck down a school district's hair-length
code. Compare the court's argument that the code is intolerable because the short-hair
norm does not promote the board's educational goals, id at 298-303, and the argument
that the code is intolerable because it interferes with privacy rights, id at 303-04. The
former argument is less convincing than the latter, in large part because the court seems
less competent at evaluating whether a norm supports a group's goal than whether it is
consistent with the law.
' Compare Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, 29 J Pub Econ at 35-37 (cited in note 43).
For further discussion, see text accompanying note 43.
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complicated optimal rules. On the whole, this line of scholarship
suggests that courts cannot deter suboptimal behavior very effec-
tively." These results must be compared with the result that a
no-damage rule is optimal if nonlegal sanctions deter opportu-
nistic behavior.65
This comparison suggests that (1) optimal contract rules
must be much simpler than the articles suggest, and (2) such
rules must discourage courts from intervening in disputes when
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms would be superior,
especially when the complexity of apparently ideal rules gener-
ates overwhelming uncertainty. Some work does deal with the
problems caused by the uncertainty of legal rules.66 Some work
even addresses the question whether courts should refuse to in-
tervene in disputes because of the uncertainty inherent in legal
rules, although this work typically compares uncertain judicial
enforcement with nonenforcement.67 However, as far as I know,
no one has attempted to compare judicial enforcement with group
enforcement in an effort to specify the conditions under which
courts should refuse to intervene in contract disputes in order to
encourage reliance on more efficient, group-run dispute resolution
mechanisms."
C. A Note on Conflict Between Groups
Individuals are members of more than one solidary group at
the same time. A woman may simultaneously be a member of the
family in which she is the wife and mother, the family in which
she is a daughter, a voluntary neighborhood association, a net-
work of friends, a church, a union local, and a work group. Each
group provides characteristic but overlapping benefits. Each
" See, for example, Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic
Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L J 615, 626-39 (1990) (on strategic incen-
tives); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L J 729, 735-62 (1992) (same); Alan Schwartz, Relational
Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21
J Legal Stud 271, 289-90 (1992) (long-term contracts).
See Kornhauser, 26 J L & Econ at 703 (cited in note 46).
See Hadfield, 23 J Legal Stud at 175-80 (cited in note 48); Schwartz, 21 J Legal
Stud at 314 (cited in note 64); Richard Craswell and John E. Calfee, Deterrence and
Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J L Econ & Org 279, 283-92 (1986) (discussing the deter-
rent effects of the uncertainty of tort enforcement); Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability:
A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 Colum L Rev 1385, 1392-95 (1987)
(underdeterrent and overdeterrent effects of legal rules).
See Hadfield, 23 J Legal Stud at 159 (cited in note 48).
However, the comparative approach of Williamson and his followers has some
similarities. See note 59.
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group demands loyalty, imposes its own obligations, and applies
its own nonlegal sanctions. Tensions arise, but so do synergies.
Tensions arise because groups demand different kinds of
behavior and impose conflicting nonlegal sanctions. A person's
friends, coworkers, and family all bid for his time and resources
by offering him increased portions of their surpluses. At the same
time, they threaten him with sanctions should he defect. But, as
nonlegal sanctions imposed by one group increase and the por-
tions of the surpluses offered by competing groups increase, he
has less reason to commit himself to any one group. In the com-
petition for members, solidary groups weaken each other's soli-
darity.
6 9
Moreover, tensions arise when factions develop within
groups. Union members who seek more benefits clash with mem-
bers who seek more wages. Religious groups divide over doctrinal
and political questions. Trade groups split over economic strate-
gy, families over career and geographical choices. When groups
split into factions, each faction develops its own norms and sanc-
tions, its own solidarity.
However, synergies can also arise; solidary groups make
alliances. The church preaches the importance of the family;
family members urge each other to go to church. In effect, the
family and the church save resources by sharing monitoring and
sanctioning costs. They can also preserve the surpluses by agree-
ing, like cartels, to monopolize different collective goods. The
family specializes in short-term mutual insurance, household
production, and child rearing; the church in insurance against
more remote contingencies and in spiritual satisfaction."0 Like-
wise, different churches offer distinctive packages of ritual and
doctrine, or they divide up the market geographically.
Similarly, business groups, social clubs, and labor unions
often require membership in approved religious organizations,
and, of course, are often based on family relationship, social sta-
tus, membership in the community, and ethnicity."' Ethnic,
See generally James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations 263-67 (Basic Books 1973).
70 Among the Amish, family members join with the rest of the community in shun-
ning a person who breaks the rules. But some religions reject the family, rather than ally
with it. Consider the arrangements that frequently prevail in religious cults, where
religious (spiritual) and family (sexual and child-rearing) functions are mingled, and
members may not interact with their real families. See text accompanying notes 15-18.
" See, for example, Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 307-10 (Oxford
1946) (H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans and eds) (business and social groups); Susan
Olzak, The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict 45 (Stanford 1992) (labor un-
ions).
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community, and cultural relations provide a basis for continuing
interaction and observation, a convenient method for distinguish-
ing insiders from outsiders, and, in effect, a bond to guarantee
performance.72
The phenomenon of multiple membership complicates group
regulation. It has several possible effects. First, a group-based
rule designed to promote a socially valuable group (say, a union)
may weaken another socially valuable group (say, a church) by
inducing members of both groups to favor the former over the
latter. The union, for example, might begin to offer social func-
tions for which people previously looked to the church.
Second, as suggested earlier,73 a group-based rule, rather
than increasing the solidarity of a group, may produce (1) in-
creased entry into the group, if the group cannot exclude people
effectively; (2) increased competition for membership in the
group, if the group can exclude people effectively; and (3) greater
competition among groups (including the self-generation of new
groups) for the benefits provided by the group-based rules.74 For
example, subsidies to unions may cause a large number of people
to join a union, the use of bribery or similar techniques to obtain
membership, and competition by different organizations to repre-
sent employees-in all cases, dissipating the benefits of the sub-
sidies and undermining group solidarity. Organizations based on
different ethnic groups compete for set-asides and other ethnical-
ly based legal advantages.75
Third, a category-based rule or an intrusive dispute resolu-
tion rule that undermines the solidarity of one group76 nonethe-
less may stimulate the solidarity of another. For example, an
antidiscrimination law that weakens the solidarity of a kye to
which a Korean entrepreneur belongs might also encourage the
formation of interracial business relationships. Overly exacting or
arbitrary contract principles might cause traders to restrict busi-
ness with strangers and fall back on ethnic- or kin-based trading
organizations.77
' See Sumner J. La Croix, Homogeneous Middleman Groups: What Determines the
Homogeneity?, 5 J L Econ & Org 211, 212-17 (1989); Carr and Landa, 12 J Legal Stud at
150-56 (cited in note 18).
7 See text accompanying note 31.
7 For a discussion of rent-seeking behavior, see Mueller, Public choice II at 229-46
(cited in note 12).
" See generally Olzak, Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict (cited in note
71).
See text accompanying note 32.
Compare Hardin, One for All at 138 (cited in note 12) (arguing that the strong
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Fourth, the state supplies legal sanctions as supplements to
groups' nonlegal sanctions in order to help them sustain a kind of
monopoly position against competing groups, including factions,
that may arise and bid for members. Laws against incest and
bigamy, in the case of the family, and laws against membership
in multiple unions, spring to mind. This way of reducing the
value of independent action and defection ensures that group
subsidies do not dissipate among many competing groups.78
D. Summary and Implications
If the state seeks to modify the law in order to encourage or
discourage certain kinds of behavior, it must take account of the
dynamics of group behavior in several ways. First, a law de-
signed to modify an actor's behavior by sanctioning or rewarding
her may be inferior to a law that subsidizes or penalizes a group
to which the actor belongs. Second, a law designed to modify the
actor's behavior or wealth may have no effect, or even the oppo-
site of the desired effect, if it incidentally changes the dynamics
of groups to which the actor belongs. Third, laws designed to
regulate the manner in which groups discipline their members
will weaken the groups unless the laws punish only high-value
defection from groups with relatively low solidarity. Fourth, laws
enacted with the purpose of subsidizing or suppressing certain
groups may have perverse results if they fail to recognize the
overlap and conflict that prevails among groups.79
The effective use of rules in these complicated ways depends
on the ability of courts, administrative agencies, and other arms
of the state to distinguish between solidary groups and atomistic
groups. This is not always a problem. Many solidary groups-for
example, "traditional" families, unions, and religious groups-are
norms of family loyalty in southern France and southern Italy resulted from the domi-
nance of hostile external powers for long periods of time; the authorities' neglect fomented
distrust between members of the communities who, in the absence of effective police and
courts to resolve disputes, fell back on family relations).
78 This rationale has been proposed for the Catholic Church's celibacy requirement for
priests, whose loyalty is therefore not divided between the Church and any children. See
Georg Simmel, The Web of Group Affiliations (Reinhard Bendix, trans), in Georg Simmel,
Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations 125, 144 (Free Press 1955). Another example is
the practice of successful communes of prohibiting monogamous relationships among
members, requiring either free love or celibacy instead. See Kanter, Commitment and
Community at 92 (cited in note 17).
"' The only other systematic attempt (of which I am aware) to propose general,
descriptive propositions about the interaction between legal and nonlegal sanctions is
Ellickson's. See Ellickson, Order Without Law at 284-86 (cited in note 5).
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easy to identify. It takes only a little more care to detect many
less conventional forms of solidarity, such as ongoing relation-
ships between corporate agents, coworkers, neighbors, extended
kin, and so on.
However, the line between a solidary and an atomistic group
shifts and blurs; indeed, the many existing group-based rules
have produced litigation in which courts and agencies must dis-
tinguish authentic from spurious religious groups, families, un-
ions, and Indian tribes." Nevertheless, courts can fall back on a
functional test of authenticity when formalities fail-a group is
solidary if its members can deter opportunistic behavior with
nonlegal sanctions. Assuming that a group performs desirable
functions and assuming that it enjoys enough solidarity that it
can be expected to remain stable for a suitable period of time
(comparable to legally sanctioned arrangements), the law should
provide whatever advantages to the informal group it does to
comparable legally recognized groups.
III. CASE STUDIES
A. Informal Economic Groups
"Informal economic groups" or "trade groups" are solidary
groups, sometimes but not always based on ethnicity, devoted to
obtaining economic or commercial benefits for their members. I
use the term broadly to include all sorts of loosely structured
associations, such as networks of ongoing business relationships
governed by their own norms.
An example comes from the experience of Japanese immi-
grants and their descendants on the west coast of the United
States. When the first immigrants from Japan arrived in the
nineteenth century,
[tiheir opportunities for employment were severely restrict-
ed. Japanese immigrants were denied citizenship rights and
therefore could not lodge complaints against discrimination.
' On religious groups, see, for example, Africa v Pennsylvania, 662 F2d 1025, 1032
(3d Cir 1981) (rejecting claim that the MOVE organization is a religion). On families, see,
for example, Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 506 (1977) (rejecting a local
ordinance's definition of a family). On unions, see Robert Gorman, Basic Text on Labor
Law, Unions and Collective Bargaining 40-92 (West 1976) (on the certification process of
unions). On Indian tribes, see William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell
3-6 (West 2d ed 1988); Bureau of Indian Affairs, Procedures for Establishing that an
American Indian Tribe Exists as an Indian Tribe, 25 CFR §§ 83.7, 83.8 (1995) (criteria for
establishing that an Indian tribe exists).
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New immigrants were forced to take jobs wherever they
could get them, and the fact that fellow ethnics offered them
an opportunity to establish themselves was bound to produce
loyalty. Societal hostility and concentration in small busi-
ness thus mutually reinforced one another.8'
These immigrants thus formed solidary associations to protect
themselves against discrimination by natives; when the natives
reacted by hostilely accusing immigrants of being clannish, the
immigrants responded by withdrawing even more. Because these
immigrants depended heavily on each other for mutual protec-
tion, opportunism was very rare. As a result,
[the] immigrant businesses, dependent upon precapitalist-
type bonds of ethnic loyalty, were not only able to survive
but could actually thrive within capitalist society. This para-
dox is resolved by the fact that under certain circumstances,
notably in marginal fields of endeavor, noncontractual rela-
tions can be less expensive and more efficient than formal
contractual ones.82
Numerous kin-based networks and ethnicity-based organizations
provided contacts, rooms, credit, aid, dispute mediation, and
other advantages that ultimately allowed more recent Japanese
immigrants and their immediate descendants to dominate certain
sectors of the economy-farming, laundries, and grocery
stores-and attain an above-average standard of living.83 In this
way a solidary group, because of discrimination against its mem-
bers, can obtain transactional economies that offset the economic
cost of the discrimination. 84
Other relations besides ethnicity and other hurdles besides
social hostility provide incentives to join solidary associations. All
economic actors who have continuing relations develop informal
methods to monitor behavior, mediate disputes, and apply nonle-
8' Bonacich and Modell, Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity at 251-52 (cited in note
12).
Id at 253.
Id at 37-63, 127-30. As Bonacich and Modell stress, the economic success of an eth-
nic group, such as the Japanese immigrants, increases the hostility of the larger popula-
tion, thereby reinforcing the immigrants' mutual dependence and solidarity.
' Other ethnic middleman groups in the United States have included Jews, Koreans
and other East Asians, Greeks, and Armenians. Other countries also provide numerous
examples, especially expatriate Indians, Pakistanis, and Chinese. See id at 269-71. See
also Landa, 10 J Legal Stud at 351-61 (cited in note 18) (explaining that trading status
depends on whether trader is family member, Chinese, or outside middleman).
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gal sanctions. Macaulay's well known study, for example, ad-
dresses the relations of manufacturers and their customersY
Other studies analyze the relations-some related to ethnicity,
some not-among actors in the garment industry; 6 consumers
and manufacturers of automobiles;" residents of cattle
country;8 diamond traders; 9 domestic workers;" commercial
landlords and tenants;9' contractors and subcontractors;92 and
members of trade associations. 3 Indeed, the relational contract
literature focuses on the continuing relations among economic
actors on the ground that such relations are far more common
than the one-shot deals assumed by traditional contract law
analysis and neoclassical economics.
94
Other less explicitly business-oriented groups provide mem-
bers with insurance, contacts, training, political power, capital,
and other advantages. These groups allow members to achieve
economic success despite the hostility of the larger population.
Although recent studies have concentrated on voluntary economic
and social associations among blacks, Japanese, Koreans, Chi-
nese, Indians, and other minority ethnic groups,95 these groups
are simply the modern versions of the mutual aid and other vol-
untary societies created by Polish, Jewish, German, Swedish,
, See Macaulay, 28 Am Soc Rev at 62-65 (cited in note 2).
See Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field'
as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L & Soc'y Rev 719, 723-29 (1973).
' See William C. Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the
Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wis L Rev 1006, 1015-45.
Ellickson, Order Without Law at 185-88 (cited in note 5).
See Bernstein, 21 J Legal Stud at 151-53 (cited in note 51).
' See Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Regulating the Unregulated?: Domestic Workers'
Social Networks, 41 Soc Probs 50, 61 (1994).
1 See Spencer MacCallum, Dispute Settlement in an American Supermarket: A
Preliminary View, in Paul Bohannan, ed, Law and Warfare: Studies in the Anthropology of
Social Conflict 291, 293-99 (Natural History 1967).
"' See, for example, Richard Lewis, Contracts Between Businessmen: Reform of the
Law of Firm Offers and an Empirical Study of Tendering Practices in the Building Indus-
try, 9 J L & Soc'y 153, 168-69 (1982).
"' See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 Colum L Rev 846, 849-56
(1961).
" See, for example, Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term Economic
Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw U L Rev
854, 896 (1978); Goetz and Scott, 67 Va L Rev at 1092-1111 (cited in note 56).
" See, for example, Ivan H. Light, Ethnic Enterprise in America: Business and
Welfare Among Chinese, Japanese and Blacks (Berkeley 1972); Thomas Sowell, Ethnic
America: A History 292 (Basic Books 1981) (Chinese, Japanese and West Indian rotating
credit associations); Trish Hall, The Old-Country Network: Expatriate entrepreneurs help
their countrymen navigate New York City's small business maze, Wall St J 51C, 51C-52C
(May 20, 1985) (discussing Greek, Korean, Indian, and Pakistani networks).
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Italian, and Irish immigrants (as well as blacks) in the nine-
teenth century and (sometimes) poorer versions of the social
clubs and old boys' networks that continue to facilitate business
relations among the mostly white, Protestant, upper-middle class
today.96
In all of these groups,9" solidarity creates relatively effective
methods for disciplining members who engage in bad-faith con-
duct. The ubiquity of these groups supports the commonplace
notion that group membership is an important element of eco-
nomic success. It also raises the intriguing possibility that, be-
cause of the prisoner's dilemma, state intervention to promote
these groups could have socially beneficial effects.
1. The rotating credit group.
We can investigate this point by focusing on Korean
kyes,"m in part because they provide a particularly clean exam-
ple of what is usually a messy phenomenon. They also illustrate
the importance of informal business associations. Estimates sug-
gest that kyes in Washington, D.C., alone hold more than one
hundred million dollars in capital; this at least partly accounts
for the disproportionate representation and wealth of Korean-
Americans in the Washington business community.99 These
See Susan D. Greenbaum, A Comparison of African American and Euro-American
Mutual Aid Societies in 19th Century America, 19 J Ethnic Stud 95, 105-14 (Fall 1991)
(comparing African-American associations with those of other immigrant groups);
Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity at 111-13 (cited in note 12) (British and American
fraternal societies). See generally Light, Ethnic Enterprise in America (cited in note 95)
(blacks, Chinese, Japanese); Sowell, Ethnic America (cited in note 95) (several ethnic
groups); Thomas Sowell, ed, Essays and Data on American Ethnic Groups (Urban Insti-
tute 1978) (statistical data).
Some studies have attempted to measure the extent to which Americans participate
in voluntary associations. It is generally believed that participation is widespread. See, for
example, Murray Hausknecht, The Joiners: A Sociological Description of Voluntary
Association Membership in the United States 23 (Bedminster 1962).
' It should be clear, despite my focus on the kye, that solidary relations exist in the
"formal" as well as in the "informal" economy. Obviously, the role of solidary relations in
the informal economy is especially significant, because actors in that economy cannot
usually enforce contracts through legal process. On the significance of the informal
economy, see, for example, Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New Develop-
ments and Old Regulations, 103 Yale L J 2289, 2304 (1994) (arguing that the informal
economy is structural, rather than anomalous, in the American economy, and should not
be criminalized); United States Department of Labor, The Underground Economy in the
United States 20 (1992) (Occasional Paper No 2) (estimates of the size of the United
States underground economy in 1980 range from 1.4 percent to 41.6 percent of GNP).
For a definition of this term, see note 7.
See Joel Garreau, For Koreans 'Keh' Is Key to Success, Wash Post B1 (Nov 3, 1991).
In Los Angeles, estimates suggest that kyes financed nearly 30 percent of new businesses
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kyes, however, compose only a fraction of the total number of
kyes in the United States, and kyes compose only the tiniest
fraction of all the informal trade groups in the United States.100
Recall that a rotating credit group typically consists of a
small number of people (ten to thirty), who periodically contrib-
ute money to a pot. At the beginning of each period, one member
takes the pot. Members determine the recipient by lottery or
bidding. Failure to make timely payments and other breaches
result in nonlegal sanctions such as criticism that, carried along
the channels of gossip, injures the defaulter's reputation and may
lead to social ostracism. When everyone has taken one pot, the
group dissolves.
The rotating credit group enables members to borrow or save
in order to purchase indivisible durable goods.'0 ' Those who
begun in Koreatown in 1987; 77 percent of the members of the Korean Garment Industry
Association participated in a kye; and some kyes pay as much as one hundred thousand
dollars per month. David J. Jefferson, Neighborhood Financing: Lending clubs offer social
support and quick capital to Asian immigrants, Wall St J R13 (Feb 24, 1989). However, it
is difficult to determine the extent to which rotating credit groups and other ethnically
based organizations account for the economic success of some ethnic and immigrant
groups (which do better than the average native). See, for example, Alejandro Portes and
Ruben G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait 58-83 (California 1990) (discussing
statistics).
'" Because academics first noticed that rotating credit groups flourished in less de-
veloped economies, early writers thought that they were no more than inefficient banks
that would be replaced by real banks as economic development proceeded. See Clifford
Geertz, The Rotating Credit Association: A "Middle Rung" in Development, 10 Econ Dev &
Cultural Change 241, 260 (1962). Subsequently, sociologists discovered that advanced
economies support numerous rotating credit groups, which prosper despite the competi-
tion of banks, credit unions, and other sophisticated financial intermediaries. In the
United States, for example, one finds rotating credit groups among Koreans ("kye"),
Mexicans ("tanda," "cundida"), Cantonese ("hui"), Japanese ("ko," "tanomoshi," "mujin),
and West Indians ("esusu"). Typically, they exist in large cities, where members live in
closely knit groups somewhat segregated from the rest of society. Members are usually
first or second generation immigrants, but they often belong to various economic levels
and occupations. See Light, Ethnic Enterprise in America at 106, 176 (cited in note 95);
Sowell, Ethnic America at 145, 167 (cited in note 95); Carlos G. V61ez-I., Social Diversity,
Commercialization, and Organizational Complexity of Urban Mexican/Chicano Rotating
Credit Associations: Theoretical and Empirical Issues of Adaptation, 41 Hum Org 107, 119
(1982) (Mexicans and Meso-Americans); Ivan Light, Im Jung Kwuon, and Deng Zhong,
Korean Rotating Credit Associations in Los Angeles, 16 Amerasia J 35, 40-47 (No 2 1990)
(occupations and locations of kye members); Aubrey W. Bonnett, Institutional Adaptation
of West Indian Immigrants to America: An Analysis of Rotating Credit Associations 31-33
(University 1981) (West Indians); Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich, Immigrant Entrepre-
neurs: Koreans in Los Angeles 1965-1982 247-54 (California 1988) (Koreans).
101 See Timothy Besley, Stephen Coate, and Glenn Loury, The Economics of Rotating
Savings and Credit Associations, 83 Am Econ Rev 792, 807 (1993); Philippe Callier,
Informal Finance: The Rotating Savings and Credit Association-An Interpretation, 43
Kyklos 273, 274 (1990).
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take later save; those who take earlier borrow. By agreeing to
take an early pot that is smaller than the sum of his total contri-
butions, the early taker pays interest to the late taker (who takes
a pot that is larger than the sum of his total contributions). If the
pot goes to the winner of a lottery, the earlier takers pay no or
low interest for their loans, and the benefit is probabilistic.
(Hence the frequency of multiple memberships.) Thus, partic-
ipation in a rotating credit group either reduces the time neces-
sary to save up to buy an indivisible good or earns interest.
The model developed in this Article helps identify three im-
portant attributes of rotating credit groups. First, rotating credit
groups deliver a collective good in the form of cheap credit for
borrowers and low-risk, high-return investments for lenders.
Second, rotating credit groups can deliver this good, despite vast
competitive disadvantages with respect to banks, which capture
scale economies, because their solidarity avoids the necessity of
written contracts, records, courts, lawyers, and professional ad-
ministrators."2 Third, these transactional economies flow from
the groups' homogeneity and the hostility of the larger popula-
tion. Ostracism from a group whose members suffer discrimina-
tion from outsiders means isolation, loss of status, loss of securi-
ty, and economic deprivation. As a result, among West Indianimmigrants in New York City, "[s]o rare was default that when
queried, most organizers did not know how they would have dealt
with such a situation." 3
Assuming that the state has an interest in maximizing social
wealth and maintaining public order, how should it respond to
rotating credit associations? Rotating credit groups appear social-
ly valuable, because they meet a demand by minorities and other
vulnerable people, such as immigrants, for low-cost financial
services that banks do not provide. However, this demand might
not by itself explain their existence. Rotating credit groups often
evade taxes, usury laws, and corporate regulations."° One
doubts the importance of usury laws and corporate laws, which
are designed to protect uninformed borrowers and investors,
when the members share ties of kinship, friendship, and commu-
nity. ' But if tax losses are high, rotating credit groups might
1"2 See, for example, Light, Ethnic Enterprise in America at 58-61 (cited in note 95);
Bonnett, Institutional Adaptation at 59-60 (cited in note 100).
10 Bonnett, Institutional Adaptation at 63-64 (cited in note 100).
Light, Im, and Deng, 16 Amerasia at 41 (cited in note 100).
105 This is not always the case. See, for example, Regina Austin, "The Black Communi-
ty," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S Cal L Rev 1769, 1782-83 (1992)
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be socially undesirable. An informed determination requires
careful study beyond the scope of this Article. °6
2. Group-based and category-based rules.
De facto exemptions from tax, usury, and corporate laws
constitute group-based advantages for rotating credit groups.
Clearly, lawmakers did not intend to transfer wealth to rotating
credit groups in this way. The interesting question is whether
these group-based advantages are socially justifiable on other
grounds. As we saw in Part II, efficiency justifies a group-based
subsidy when it enables a group to capture a surplus that would
otherwise be lost because of the prisoner's dilemma. The extraor-
dinary success of kyes, both in maintaining discipline and gener-
ating wealth, suggests that they do produce more wealth for their
members than tax and related savings alone could produce. Con-
firmation of this conjecture, however, requires empirical analysis
that is beyond the scope of this Article.
Category-based rules relevant to rotating credit groups in-
clude welfare laws, to the extent that the relevant Korean immi-
grants are poor, and antidiscrimination laws, to the extent that
Korean immigrants suffer from discrimination. Recall that cate-
gory-based rules reduce the cooperation-defection differentials for
group members within the category if the benefits they produce
are substitutes for the group's surplus.0 7 If welfare laws make
Koreans less dependent on the kyes (and their communal ties,
generally) for economic security, and if antidiscrimination laws
make them less dependent on the kyes for credit, then kyes (and
communal ties) become less important to maintain. The coopera-
tion-defection differential may fall to zero, even if a potential
(noting exploitation in black informal economy); Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and the Ex-
ploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legisla-
tion, 103 Yale L J 2179, 2181-88 (1994) (discussing sweatshops). Austin argues that the
black informal economy is on balance beneficial, and proposes, among other things, that
the state exempt actors in the black informal economy from certain commercial rules. The
proposal illustrates the approach of using group-based rules to foster the solidarity of
groups. Austin, 65 S Cal L Rev at 1816.
"o' Cooter and Landa fear that solidary trading groups may act as cartels. See Cooter
and Landa, 4 Intl Rev L & Econ at 21 (cited in note 18). But cartel-like behavior is only
possible in an uncompetitive market; potential entrants and commercial competitors
restrain groups (as kyes must compete against banks). Cooter and Landa suggest that a
more perfect contract law would solve the problem of cartel-like behavior. Id at 22. Even if
feasible, however, this would exacerbate the collective action problem faced by the groups,
potentially causing an efficiency loss, rather than a gain.
"o7 See text accompanying note 32.
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surplus from cooperation (over independent action) remains. If all
this is true, antidiscrimination laws and other laws... that
transfer wealth to Koreans as a category may reduce the wealth
of individual kye members-indeed, possibly by more than any
increase in wealth to the category as a whole.0 9
However, this analysis is highly tentative. First,
antidiscrimination and other laws may not have these effects on
behavior. A crucial assumption is that antidiscrimination laws,
as category-based rules, increase the value of defection without
also increasing the value of cooperation by an equal or greater
amount. Second, any conclusion about efficiency must also take
into account the independent, nongroup efficiency effects of wel-
fare and antidiscrimination laws. Still, the argument's logic re-
sembles a concern that has surfaced in recent writings about race
relations, namely that civil rights laws and the welfare state
discourage cooperative behavior within minority groups."0
Richard Epstein makes the related point that in hiring em-
ployees, businesses rely on the solidarity of ethnic groups to
obtain transactional economies."' Information channels within
ethnic networks reduce the cost of advertising for hires, and the
desire to maintain a reputation as a good worker within one's
10" A law worth considering in this context is the Community Reinvestment Act, 12
USC §§ 2901 et seq (1988 & Supp 1992), which directs federal banking agencies to encour-
age banks to supply credit to low-income neighborhoods. Some commentators argue that
the law, among other things, will encourage banks to avoid doing business in low-income
neighborhoods and set up their operations elsewhere. See Jonathan R. Macey and
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 Va L Rev
291, 314-15 (1993). We can add that even if the law caused banks to subsidize their
operations in low-income neighborhoods, this effect could injure the intended beneficiaries
by giving members of their rotating credit groups incentives to defect to the less efficient
banks. The magnitude of this perverse effect will vary: rotating credit groups are less
common in poor (non-West Indian) black neighborhoods than in poor Asian and Mexican
neighborhoods. See Light, Ethnic Enterprise in America at 23 (cited in note 95).
10 Apparently, kyes have in recent times become less popular. See Jefferson, Neigh-
borhood Financing, Wall St J at R14 (cited in note 99).
,11 Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century black mutual aid societies illustrate this
point. One author attributes their decline to desegregation, which allowed blacks to take
advantage of the larger risk pools offered by white-controlled insurance companies.
Greenbaum, 19 J Ethnic Stud at 105 (cited in note 96). Some blacks today lament the loss
of the solidarity that existed prior to the civil rights era, when the hostility of whites
forced blacks to cooperate with each other in many areas of life. See Peter Applebome, A
Sweetness Tempers South's Bitter Past, NY Times 1, 20 (July 31, 1994); Peter Applebome,
From Atlanta to Birmingham, Blur of Progress and Stagnation, NY Times A14 (Aug 3,
1994). To lament this loss of solidarity is not, however, to lament the arrival of civil
rights; most would find the tradeoff worthwhile.
. Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimi-
nation Laws 69-72 (Harvard 1992).
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community deters opportunism on the job. Laws prohibiting em-
ployers from acquiring an ethnically homogeneous workforce
prevent employers from exploiting these transactional efficien-
cies." This results in increased prices and reduced wages. Ep-
stein does not, but could also, point out that such laws addition-
ally injure the solidary ethnic communities themselves by reduc-
ing the value of cooperation with coethnics. But, again, it is dif-
ficult to balance these efficiency losses against the gains that the
antidiscrimination laws produce in other contexts.
3. Dispute resolution.
A recent case in Los Angeles illustrates the argument from
Part II.B regarding judicial intervention in dispute resolu-
tion." The case involved a kye, whose thirty-one members each
paid in about $3,334 per month, and received the right to take a
one-time distribution of $100,000 on a given month. Some mem-
bers bought the right to take earlier by agreeing to accept less
than $100,000, while other members accepted the right to take
later in return for the right to make contributions of less than
$3,334 per month; earlier takers, in effect, borrowed money at
interest from later takers.
The case arose in the middle of the cycle, after the organizers
of the kye demanded that a member household, Young-Wan and
Hyn-Sun Song, supply collateral to secure their future payments.
The organizers did not ask any other members to do this. Appar-
ently, the organizers had heard that a relative of the Songs had
declared bankruptcy and feared that the Songs were insolvent as
well. When the Songs refused to supply the collateral, the orga-
nizers told the Songs that they would not receive a distribution.
The Songs responded by refusing to make further contributions.
One of the organizers, Jung-Hie Park, sued the Songs for dam-
ages.
The judge of the Superior Court in Los Angeles ruled that
the kye "is in fact a lottery and as such is being operated illegally
' Epstein cites a case where the EEOC penalized a small business that hired people
exclusively through Hispanic organizations. See id at 70-71. See also EEOC v Consolidat-
ed Service Systems, 989 F2d 233 (7th Cir 1993), where the EEOC sued a small Korean-
owned janitorial service (annual sales of four hundred thousand dollars) on the ground
that its word-of-mouth hiring policies discriminated in favor of Koreans. The EEOC had
spent seven years litigating against this business at the time of the appellate decision.
Over a period of several years 73 percent of the applicants and 81 percent of the hires
were of Korean descent. Id at 235.
"' See text accompanying notes 46-63.
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by the organizers thereof. Further, the operation and organiza-
tion of the [kye] is also a form of security that is being sold to the
individual members without first obtaining a permit from the
proper regulatory authorities.""4  He accordingly dismissed
Park's claim."'
To evaluate whether judicial intervention was or was not
appropriate in this case, we must focus on the contract law di-
mensions of the dispute. To this end, imagine the following argu-
ments. The Songs argue that it was never part of the deal that
they would have to put up collateral in order to receive their
distribution. By withholding the distribution due to the Songs,
the organizers breached their side of the bargain, and the Songs
justifiably refused to make any additional payments.
The organizers respond that the bankruptcy of the Songs'
relative made the Songs an unacceptable risk to the kye. Against
background norms that require cooperation among relatives, the
Songs' failure to aid their relative and the relative's future inabil-
ity to aid the Songs indicated financial weakness on the part of
the Songs. By requiring the Songs to supply security, the organiz-
ers properly exercised their authority, under the terms of the
kye, to protect its viability.
But did the organizers have such authority? And, if so, did it
include the power to sue the Songs? On this issue, the Songs
argue that the organizers' use of the courts violated a group rule
against use of judicial process."6 If the Songs behaved poorly,
they would face nonlegal sanctions; if not, the organizers would
face nonlegal sanctions."1 Reliance on nonlegal sanctions is
surely desirable for the kye, because courts err more often than
do solidary groups (as the judge's analogy between the kye and a
lottery amply demonstrates)."'
11 Park v Song, No BC044756 (Cal Super Ct 1993) (minutes of final status conference)
(on file with U Chi L Rev).
"' Id. See also Kenneth Reich, Court Ruling Deals Blow to the Private Pooling of
Money, LA Times B12 (Sept 25, 1993); Dick Goldberg, Judge Finds 'Gae' Is an Illegal
Lottery, LA Daily J 1, 20 (Sept 24, 1993); Jake Doherty, An American Wrinkle in Korean
Loans, LA Times City Times 3 (Oct 3, 1993).
116 The norm against resorting to judicial process to resolve disputes is extremely com-
mon in solidary groups. See, for example, Macaulay, 28 Am Soc Rev at 61 (cited in note 2)
(commercial transactions); Ellickson, Order Without Law at 60-64 (cited in note 5) (cattle
ranchers); Mentschikoff, 61 Colum, L Rev at 850-52 (cited in note 93) (trade association
arbitration).
117 Such sanctions can be severe. For example, members of future kyes may ban a
dishonest organizer.
11 While the judge's ruling that the kye violated securities laws may have been cor-
rect, his ruling that the kye was a lottery was erroneous. Lotteries appeal only to risk-
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However, unforeseen contingencies arguably justified this
particular suit: the case arose in the aftermath of the Los Angel-
es riots-a calamitous event for the local Korean community that
likely reduced the cooperation-defection differential of members
of kyes. The threat of ostracism loses its force when community
devastation makes flight an attractive alternative. So, although
under ordinary circumstances, nonlegal sanctions would ade-
quately penalize the Songs or the organizers, the extraordinary
circumstances of the riots undermined the effectiveness of nonle-
gal sanctions and justified the organizers' suit. In other words,
although the kye contract did not expressly allow organizers to
sue defectors following an extraordinary event, the appropriate
default rule (the one that the parties would have chosen and that
would maximize the ex ante value of the kye) gives this power to
the organizers because the available nonlegal sanctions are too
weak to deter high-stakes opportunism. We have, thus, in a
roundabout way, returned to the argument that courts should be
more willing to intervene in cases of high-value defection from
less solidary groups than in cases of low-value defection from
more solidary groups.19
4. Summary.
Ethnic, solidary trading groups provide important collective
goods to their members, and indeed seem to account for the eco-
nomic success of some ethnic groups. If this is true, efficiency and
takers because the cost of the ticket exceeds the expected payout. A share in a kye,
however, like a savings account with a bank or a loan from a bank, appeals to anyone who
seeks to flatten out his consumption over time; the member's contributions, adjusted for
interest, equal his expected payout.
" A recent study of Delaware Chancery opinions observes that they often contain de-
tailed, moralistic descriptions of the good and bad behavior of managers, directors, and
lawyers-for example, criticizing a manager for insufficient regard for the shareholders'
interests even while holding in the manager's favor. The author argues that the court
uses reputational sanctions to deter opportunism, for the small corporate bar can punish
wrongdoers by recommending that shareholders refuse to hire them. See Edward B. Rock,
The Peculiar Mechanisms of Corporate Law: Delaware Fiduciary Duty Caselaw as Narra-
tive (on file with U Chi L Rev). Under this analysis, the court properly intervenes to
penalize egregious behavior, and defers to nonlegal sanctions in the face of less egregious
behavior. Interestingly, it uses a group-based rule-providing the corporate bar with a
free information service-in order to facilitate the spread of information and, thus, the
application of nonlegal sanctions against opportunistic actors. See, for example, In re J.P.
Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A2d 770, 779-80 (Del Chanc 1988) (denying
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction while acknowledging its "legitimate ques-
tions"); In re Fort Howard Corp Shareholders Litigation, 1988 Del Chanc LEXIS 110, *36
(denying preliminary injunction while noting that "aspects [of the transaction] supply a
suspicious mind with fuel to feed its flame").
1996]
The University of Chicago Law Review [63:133
redistributional goals support strengthening such groups, both
through group-based subsidies and, except in cases of high-value
defection, through judicial deference to group dispute resolution.
Does this mean, then, in the end that antidiscrimination laws
injure minorities by interfering with their ability to sustain sol-
idary groups? Maybe not, if interference with collective action is
dwarfed by the benefits that those laws produce. But, then, if
antidiscrimination laws benefit minorities in this way, is it point-
less to try to promote the solidarity of their groups? These ques-
tions require further study.2 °
A more general point is that if most trading occurs within
solidary trading groups, ethnic or otherwise, contract law must
take account of this phenomenon.'2 One possible consequence
is that contract law should defer to group mechanisms for dispute
resolution, even when these mechanisms are highly informal.
Another possible consequence is that the law should interfere
with highly valuable transactions between an insider and outsid-
ers when the transactions would violate the rules of the insider's
group.'22 Finally, it may be the case that the law should grant
privileges to trading and similar groups.'23 These issues also
require further study.
120 The question is complicated, because discrimination may be directed against
groups, as well as against individuals, and, even when directed mostly against individu-
als, it may deter cooperation when cooperative behavior is salient. Thus, the greatest
amount of cooperation may occur when there is some but not too much discrimination. For
example, "[iun [New York City], relatively infrequent numbers of attacks [on white immi-
grants] were more beneficial to the survival of immigrant papers than either periods
experiencing no attacks or periods with very high numbers of attacks .... " Olzak, Dy-
namics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict at 206-07 (cited in note 71). These data suggest
that as the value of independent action declines (because of hostility) and thus the value
of the cooperative surplus rises, collective action becomes more likely; but when hostility
exceeds a certain threshold, both independent action and collective action are inferior to
invisibility.
11 Mark Granovetter advances the claim that economic interaction is embedded in
solidary relations. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 Am J Soc 481, 487-91 (1985).
12 For examples in the context of families, see text accompanying notes 176-78.
12 The British government supported friendly societies in nineteenth-century Eng-
land. These were self-regulating, solidary groups that provided health, life, and disability
insurance to their members. Group-based advantages for these societies included the right
to deposit funds at savings banks at a special rate of interest and certain bankruptcy
privileges. The British government supported them because they reduced the
government's poor-relief burden. See Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity at 112-13 &
n 8 (cited in note 12). In the United States, fraternal ethnic associations served similar
purposes, but I do not know whether any governments benefitted them with group-based
rules.
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B. Labor Law and Employment Law
The laws governing employment relations usefully display
the tension between the use of group-based rules (labor law) to
delegate power to groups and the use of category-based rules
(employment law) to regulate directly.
Union locals illustrate the analysis of solidary groups in
several ways. First, the cooperative surplus consists of the higher
wages and superior benefits organized employees receive com-
pared to those obtained by nonunionized workers. The size of this
surplus depends on a union's bargaining power. This in turn
depends on the substitutability of capital and nonunion labor for
union labor, the proportion of labor costs to total costs, the elas-
ticity of consumer demand for the employer's product, and the
elasticity of supply of other factors used by the employer for pro-
duction.' Second, union locals' small size deprives them of
scale economies. They lack the bargaining power of the spontane-
ous contractual alliances between all existing and potential work-
ers that would exist in the absence of transaction costs. Third,
union locals' small size allows them to obtain transactional effi-
ciencies.' Because members know and trust each other, they
can engage in flexible and disciplined collective action. Fourth,
union locals maintain their cohesion through nonlegal sanctions.
Indeed, union leaders typically encourage solidarity by binding
members together through social activities; consequently, ostra-
cism and other nonlegal sanctions often can be effective. 6
1. Group-based and category-based rules.
The Wagner Act'27 and other American laws governing la-
bor relations can be understood as a system of rules designed to
promote workplace solidarity. 2 ' These group-based rules in-
2' See Barry T. Hirsch and John T. Addison, The Economic Analysis of Unions: New
Approaches and Evidence 13 (Allen & Unwin 1986).
" Compare the findings with respect to industrial work groups in Stanley E. Sea-
shore, Group Cohesiveness in the Industrial Work Group 90-95 (Michigan 1954) (high
cohesiveness in small groups).
12 See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James S. Coleman,
Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union 69-105
(Free Press 1956); Kornblum, Blue Collar Community at 61-63 (cited in note 55) (describ-
ing day-to-day social and union discipline).
" National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC §§ 151-69 (1988).
1 For an elaboration of this theme and evidence of legislative intent, see Mark
Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace
Cooperation, 106 Harv L Rev 1379, 1418-22 (1993). See also Richard Lempert and Joseph
Sanders, An Invitation to Law and Social Science: Desert, Disputes, and Distribution 321-
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clude a variety of privileges granted to unions over the years,
such as exemption from antitrust laws, mandatory bargaining
privileges with the employer over certain subjects, protections for
union organization, and rules governing elections.129 These
rules transfer wealth and power from nonunionized workers,
employers, consumers, and other outsiders to unionized or poten-
tially unionized workers. A number of group-based rules, in-
cluding rules against closed shops, rules allowing employers to
hire replacement workers during strikes, and rules prohibiting second-
ary boycotts, injure unions. However, against the pre-New Deal
labor law background, the group-based labor laws clearly mani-
fest an overall state purpose to support unionization.
Do such rules increase the solidarity of unions? Although
they increase the value of union membership, they also increase
the incentive to free ride. But, since the cooperation-defection
differential would remain constant, the labor laws should not
affect the incidence of unionization. However, the group-based
labor laws must have initially enabled unions to convert some of
their increased wealth and power into more effective enforcement
mechanisms.'
As discussed before, the delegation of power to an organiza-
tion raises two kinds of problems for the state. Labor law exem-
plifies these problems. First, the group's interests do not precisely
reflect the state's: unions do not merely seek market wages-they
seek above-market wages. Moreover, unions sometimes pursue
the interests of more powerful factions at the expense of weaker
factions. Second, the group helps only its members: unions do not
improve the position of nonunionized employees. Nevertheless,
group-based rules promote efficiency if they meet three condi-
tions: first, if group-based rules promote union solidarity; second,
if unions produce benefits for members that they would not be
able to obtain independently; and, third, if the legal promotion of
union solidarity increases benefits to union members by more
than the cost of any negative externalities resulting from such
promotion."'
24 (Longman 1986) (arguing that labor laws help unions overcome collective action
problem).
See Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law, Unions and Collective Bargaining at 46-49,
624-35 (cited in note 80).
"3 The upsurge in union membership following enactment of the Wagner Act supports
this interpretation. See Albert Rees, The Economics of Trade Unions 15 (Chicago 3d ed
1989) (Union membership doubled between 1933 and 1937.).
131 See Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 247 (Basic
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Category-based rules (reflected in employment law) transfer
wealth from nonworkers (for example, employers, consumers, and
the unemployed) to workers. Examples include minimum wage
and maximum hours rules, safety regulations, employment dis-
crimination rules, and pension protection rules. These rules nar-
row the gap between union wage packages and nonunion wage
packages by forcing employers to improve the latter without
affecting the former. Employee benefits provided by employment
law do not in any obvious way complement the benefits provided
by unions. Thus, employment laws reduce the cooperation-defec-
tion differential and, as a consequence, union solidarity.'32 One
can thus conjecture that the rise of employment law, especially in
the 1960s, accounts in part for the decline of unions. 3 '
If employment laws affected employee well-being in exactly
the same way as labor laws, this decline would not matter. But
the problem with employment laws is that they are insensitive to
the varying needs of different workplaces. In some workplaces,
an OSHA standard is too strict; in others, it is too lax."M By
Books 1984).
"32 Thus, one would predict that unions would oppose employment laws. In fact, at
various times, unions have opposed employment laws. In the 1910s, "[sikilled workers'
unusual bargaining power often enabled them to improve hours and wages and gain
workplace reforms that less-skilled workers were unable to gain or defend without legisla-
tion. Accordingly, their unions weighed the costs of broad politics (and broad industrial
action) more warily than did unions of less-skilled workers." William E. Forbath, Law and
the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 55 (Harvard 1991). See also Michael Gold-
field, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States 30 (Chicago 1987) ("U.S. labor
unions may be regarded as quite weak in their influence on social legislation."); Rees,
Economics of Trade Unions at 9 (cited in note 130) (The AFL, "until the 1930s, opposed
efforts to improve the terms of employment through legislation."). The story, however, is
complex; often, unions have supported employment laws. Both Forbath and Goldfield
attribute unions' lack of support for social legislation to other factors. See Forbath, Law
and Shaping at 55, 130-35; Goldfield, Decline of Organized Labor at 27-30. Obviously, an
analysis of this phenomenon must consider issues of political economy and historical
contingency that exceed the scope of this argument. An employment law that weakens the
incentive to unionize over time may nevertheless serve a particular union's short-term
interest. At any rate, many American unions, especially the AFL under Gompers, have
historically placed more emphasis on obtaining group-based benefits such as bargaining
privileges, immigration restrictions, and closed-shop laws than on obtaining social legisla-
tion. See Wilson, Political Organizations at 121-29 (cited in note 69).
"2 See George R. Neumann and Ellen R. Rissman, Where Have All the Union Mem-
bers Gone?, 2 J Labor Econ 175, 179 (1984) (The twenty years after the enactment of the
Wagner Act saw a sharp increase in union membership, from 13 percent of the workforce
to 35 percent; but between the 1950s and the present, union membership has plummet-
ed.). Because unions have provided mutual insurance, and welfare provides a close substi-
tute, the rise of welfare might also have contributed to the decline of unions. There is
some evidence for this hypothesis. See id at 185. For other arguments about the causes of
the decline, see Rees, Economics of Trade Unions at 187-90 (cited in note 130).
13 See Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace. The Future of Labor and Employ-
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contrast, unions and employers draw from a fund of information
and experience unavailable to government agencies and are
therefore likely to agree on more appropriate standards, especial-
ly if competitive labor and product markets prevent holdouts on
either side. This has led some to argue that employment law
alone cannot solve the problems of the workplace, and that the
state should therefore both promote strong unions and enforce employ-
ment laws.
3 1
However, this proposal raises anew the tension between
group-based rules and category-based rules. More strongly pro-
union labor laws enable unions to conspire with employers to
evade undesirable employment laws. Stricter employment laws
undermine unionization by increasing the value to employees of
independent action. Thus, strengthening both labor and employ-
ment laws is likely to have little effect on the position of union-
ized or potentially unionized workers, even assuming uncompeti-
tive markets, or, at least, arbitrary and uneven effects from
workplace to workplace. What should the state do?
Assuming, arguendo, that the goals underlying labor and
employment law are valid, the state's optimal approach depends
on the conditions of a given workplace. In workplaces dominated
by solidary and nondiscriminatory unions, the state should en-
force labor laws. In atomistic workplaces where conditions make
unionization unattractive, the state should enforce employment
laws. In marginal workplaces, the state should promote unioniza-
tion where economic conditions favor unionization and should
enforce employment laws where such conditions are absent.35
The diversity of workplaces may frustrate legislative implemen-
tation of this approach. But judges can use this approach to in-
terpret the law, and agencies can use it when deciding how best
to allocate their resources.
ment Law 27, 93-94, 152-61 (Harvard 1990).
" Id at 161; Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary
Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U Pa L Rev 457, 531-32, 537-38 (1992). Compare Charles
Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State
of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U Chi L Rev 1012, 1040 (1984) (arguing for employ-
ment law over labor law), with Cass R. Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity:
A Comment, 51 U Chi L Rev 1041, 1059 (1984) (pointing out deficiencies of employment
law and suggesting the importance of labor law for promoting solidarity).
... To be sure, an employer who can easily substitute capital for labor would just as
likely fire people under a regime of employment law as under a regime of labor law. But
presumably the remaining employees would obtain superior benefits, and this tradeoff is
apparently consistent with the policy of employment laws.
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2. Dispute resolution.
Unions' nonlegal sanctions range from social pressure, to
fines, to intimidation and assault.'37  The Wagner Act of
1935,13 which regulated the employer's treatment of its em-
ployees more heavily than the union's treatment of its members,
tolerated-and even encouraged-nonviolent sanctions. But per-
ceived abuses by unions led to greater regulation under the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947."' This law enabled workers to bring unfair
labor practice charges against unions. The continuing trend in
favor of worker rights has led to rules preventing unions from (1)
restricting members' attempts to file unfair labor practice charges
against them; (2) encouraging members to violate collective bar-
gaining agreements; and (3) restricting members' participation in
union affairs.140
If the state seeks to strengthen unions, it should not shield
workers from union discipline except in cases of high-value op-
portunism by leaders in relatively low-solidarity unions. The
prevailing intrusive approach suggests suspicion about the integ-
rity of unions. " But even assuming a policy of promoting union
solidarity, the appropriate level of intervention should vary. Be-
cause different unions enjoy different levels of solidarity, what
would count as high-stakes opportunism in one union may count
as low-stakes opportunism in another. As in the case of
group-based and category-based rules, agencies and courts must
be sensitive to levels of solidarity when intervening in disputes.
C. Religious Groups'
Religious congregations produce a variety of collective goods
for their members, including spiritual satisfaction, a sense of
131 See, for example, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman, Union Democracy at 164 (cited in
note 126); Rees, Economics of Trade Unions at 25 (cited in note 130) (social pressure).
' 29 USC § 151.
' 29 USC §§ 141 et seq (1988). See also Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law, Unions
and Collective Bargaining at 5-6 (cited in note 80).
' See Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law, Unions and Collective Bargaining at 680-89
(cited in note 80).
1 Compare, for example, the freer reign given to .families. See Part III.D.
1 For example, a refusal by a member to attend a meeting or rally might be
deterrable by a strongly solidary union, but not by a weakly solidary union.
' I discuss religious groups more fully in Eric A. Posner, The Legal Regulation of
Religious Groups (on file with U Chi L Rev). Some of the arguments in that article and in
this Part originate with Adam Smith. See Adam Smith, 2 An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations 788-814 (Clarendon 1976). See also Laurence R.
Iannaccone, Religious Markets and the Economics of Religion, 39 Soc Compass 123 (1992).
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community, education, and moral discipline. They produce these
goods in part by instilling in members discipline that is unavail-
able elsewhere in society. Like trade groups and union locals,
religious groups choose a size that allows them sufficient resourc-
es but does not sacrifice monitoring economies. By limiting the
congregation to a small number of people, the religious leader-
ship ensures that everyone knows everyone else and can effec-
tively impose sanctions on deviants. Thus, religious groups main-
tain discipline by imposing nonlegal sanctions, either hierarchi-
cally (from the leadership) or horizontally (among the mem-
bers).'"
1. Group-based and category-based rules.
Suppose the state seeks to encourage socially valuable reli-
gious groups and discourage socially costly religious groups. Cur-
rent group-based advantages include tax exemptions for religious
organizations and for charitable contributions to religious organi-
zations, and subsidies to social agencies operated by religious
groups.45 History also supplies abundant examples of group-
based disadvantages, including the denial of civil rights and busi-
ness opportunities, not to mention taxation, imprisonment, and
execution.
Tax exemptions may increase the solidarity of religious
groups. If so, religious groups would produce a supply of collec-
tive goods closer to the optimal level. Although some of these
collective goods-for example, spiritual satisfaction-might not
interest the state, other collective goods might have significant
positive externalities-such as the reduction of poverty among
members and nonmembers associated with mutual aid and chari
14 Among the Amish, for example, rule breakers must endure a public confession or,
if they refuse, face excommunication and shunning. If a person is shunned, no one will
eat, speak, do business with, or otherwise interact with that person. "For the unrepen-
tant, social avoidance becomes a life-time quarantine." Donald B. Kraybill, Negotiating
with Caesar, in Donald B. Kraybill, ed, The Amish and the State 3, 11 (Johns Hopkins
1993). See also Robert L. Kidder, The Role of Outsiders, in Donald B. Kraybill, ed, The
Amish and the State 213, 230-31 (Johns Hopkins 1993) (describing orthodox Amish
practice of ostracizing members who mingle with outsiders). Notice that the leadership
declares the sanction, but its implementation requires the participation of all members.
145 See Walz v Tax Commissioner, 397 US 664 (1970) (property tax exemption);
Hernandez v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 US 680 (1988) (income tax deduction
for charitable contribution); Bowen v Kendrick, 487 US 589 (1988) (grants for counseling
centers run by religious groups).
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ty,146 and the reduction of deviant behavior.'47 But the usual
qualifications apply. Some religious groups treat their members
in a way that is inconsistent with the state's interests (for exam-
ple, child abuse) and engage in antisocial activity (such as draft
resistance). Even the more mainstream religious groups might
undermine the state's goals, for example, by redistributing the
subsidy to their members, rather than using it to improve their
solidarity. Finally, subsidization of religious groups does not
benefit nonmembers (except indirectly as beneficiaries of religious
charity).
These problems may justify the state's use of category-based
rules to provide substitutes for religiously produced collective
goods, such as welfare law for poverty and the criminal law for
deviant behavior. However, the model predicts that, as the state
imposes more rigorous rules governing moral conduct, religious
institutions will weaken: as laws become more severe and cer-
tain, people can depend on the law to deter them and their chil-
dren from engaging in deviant behavior. This argument, though,
assumes that people join religions for discipline, when in fact
people join religions for a multiplicity of reasons. Moreover, crim-
inal laws are crude instruments compared to the social pressures
that a solidary church can exert. As such, they are poor substi-
tutes for these pressures.
It also follows that the welfare system undermines religious
organizations. Although, to my knowledge, no empirical study
supports this proposition, the intuition is powerful enough to
have motivated the Amish to seek and obtain a limited exemp-
tion from the Social Security system.
Their current social welfare structure of mutual reliance
among members greatly strengthens Amish communal soli-
darity. If individuals began receiving income from outside
the community through Social Security or other social wel-
fare programs, the Amish fear that community ties would be
undermined and the cohesiveness of their culture threat-
ened.'
1 See Jeff E. Biddle, Religious Organizations, in Charles E. Clotfelter, ed, Who Bene-
fits from the Nonprofit Sector? 92, 95-104 (Chicago 1992).
W The empirical impact of religious groups on deviance is controversial. See L.E.
Ross, Religion and Deviance: Exploring the Impact of Social Control Elements, 14 Soc
Spectrum 65 (1994); John K. Cochran, Peter B. Wood, and Bruce J. Arneklev, Is the
Religiosity-Delinquency Relationship Spurious? A Test of Arousal and Social Control
Theories, 31 J Res Crim & Delinq 92, 113-14 (1994).
" Peter J. Ferrara, Social Security and Taxes, in Donald B. Kraybill, ed, The Amish
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The Social Security exemption for religious organizations that
"make provisions for their dependent members"'49 is a group-
based rule that delegates power to religious groups. The state, in
effect, free rides on their disciplinary mechanisms and their in-
ternal provision of welfare. In the case of the Amish-who have
few illegitimate teenage pregnancies, divorces, abusers of drugs
or alcohol, and cases of unemployment-poverty is rare, and
group delegation effectively serves the state's interests.50
The religion clauses of the United States Constitution, how-
ever, restrict the ability of the state to manipulate religious
groups in order to promote social goals. 5' Does the theory of
group solidarity shed light on the proper scope of these clauses?
To see that it does, suppose a religious group becomes powerful
in a community, and the local government provides benefits to
the group in exchange for support from that group's leadership.
The resulting increase in the size of the group's surplus stimu-
lates an increase in membership. Meanwhile, the religious lead-
ership feels pressure to alter its message and practices to con-
form to the state's needs, for example, by exhorting church mem-
bers to vote for X. Although this message would presumably
increase the number of people who vote for X, it would also alien-
ate some members of the congregation, weakening its solidarity.
In an effort to strengthen such a useful ally, the state could
increase the surplus still further by, for example, conditioning
state employment on group membership. More people would rush
to join the group, swelling its ranks. But the true believers (who,
by hypothesis, desire the discipline of religion) leave and join
weaker, rival religious organizations. Eventually, the original
church becomes an agency of the state; state money and police
maintain discipline. Legal sanctions replace nonlegal sanctions.
The state has, by now, lost the ability to free ride on the religious
group's internal discipline.
This story suggests, then, not only why governments are
tempted to favor some religions over others, but also why the
long-term interest of the state resides in free exercise and dises-
tablishment.152
and the State 125, 130 (Johns Hopkins 1993). Of course, they also oppose participation for
purely religious reasons.
26 USC § 1402(g)(1)(D) (1988).
'o See generally Ferrera, Social Security and Taxes at 125-43 (cited in note 148). In-
terestingly, an Amish person loses her social security exemption if she is excommunicated.
See Borntrager v Commissioner, 58 Tax Ct Mem Dec (CCH) 1242, 1243 (1990).
"' US Cost, Amend I.
12 For a more detailed discussion, with qualifications, see Posner, Legal Regulation of
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2. Dispute resolution.
The Free Exercise Clause and common law principles of free
association not only prevent people from suing a religious group
for expelling them, but also religious groups from suing people
for exiting.153 However, there are a few cases involving suits by
people ostracized from Amish and Mennonite sects against their
former coreligionists; in some of these cases, the courts have
awarded damages. For example, in 1946 Andrew Yoder sued four
Amish officials for excommunicating him after he switched to
another Amish sect that allowed members to drive automobiles.
A court awarded five thousand dollars in damages."' In two
earlier cases (in 1878 and 1919) excommunicated plaintiffs also
won relief.155
The jury in the Yoder case evidently believed that the prac-
tice of shunning was offensive and that Yoder deserved damages
for emotional harm. If so, the award interfered with the group's
dispute resolution mechanisms, and, whether intended by thejury or not, weakened the solidarity of the sect.
By contrast, in another incident, a shunned member of an
Amish sect sought revenge by trying to sell his land to an entre-
preneur who planned to develop it for commercial purposes.'56
The Amish feared that commercial development would disturb
their way of life and corrupt their children, but lacked any sanc-
tion beyond ostracism to prevent the sale. However, non-Amish
neighbors and other outsiders lobbied local authorities to enact a
zoning ordinance that would prohibit the sale.5 7 Viewed pro-
Religious Groups (cited in note 143).
'" With respect to common law principles, see Watson v Jones, 80 US (13 Wall) 679,
730-34 (1871). With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, courts refuse to interfere with
dismissals of religious officials and sometimes even with dismissals of teachers employed
by religious schools. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Pay Discrimination by Religious
Organizations, 41 Daily Labor Rep (BNA) D-1 (Mar 1, 1990); Miller v Catholic Diocese,
224 Mont 113, 728 P2d 794, 797 (1986) (Free Exercise Clause barred fired teacher's tort
claim against religious school.); Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. v Ohio Civil Rights Com-
mission, 766 F2d 932, 961 (6th Cir 1985), rev'd on other grounds and vacated, 477 US 619
(1986) (Free Exercise Clause barred fired teacher's sex discrimination claim against
religious school.). See generally Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 US
696, 708-20 (1976) (First Amendment limits the reach of civil courts.).
"' See John Howard Yoder, Caesar and the Meidung, 23 Mennonite Q Rev 76, 77
(1949).
'" See id at 78. See also Paul v Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc.,
819 F2d 875, 883 (9th Cir 1987) (ostracism by Jehovah's Witnesses). For other cases and
further discussion, see Posner, Legal Regulation of Religious Groups (cited in note 143).
' See Kidder, Role of Outsiders at 231-32 (cited in note 144).
'5 The outcome of the dispute is unclear. See id.
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spectively, the neighbors thus attempted to deter high-value
defections, and their willingness to do so may have promoted the
solidarity of the sect.
Schism-a dispute involving a high-value issue, such as
control of church property-provides a useful contrast to low-
stakes ostracism cases. Specifically, because schism involves a
high-value dispute between members of a low-solidarity group,
state intervention is more justified.'
D. Families
Families illustrate the analysis of solidary groups in familiar
ways. 5 ' First, the cooperative surplus consists of (1) mutual in-
surance (one spouse supports the other during periods of unem-
ployment 6 '), and (2) child production and socialization (chil-
dren raised by two spouses are less likely to engage in deviant
behavior than children raised by a single parent 1'). To the ex-
tent that family members perform all household functions, they
lose the scale economies of the differentiated labor market, but
the family's small size allows it to obtain transactional econo-
mies. Intimate knowledge of the personalities and the daily be-
havior of each member facilitates monitoring and sanctioning.
Finally, family members deter opportunism by disciplining each
other in various ways, including criticism or, in the extreme, exit
or expulsion from the household.
1. Group-based and category-based rules.
Tax subsidies to families, zoning ordinances that reserve
pleasant areas for families or family-size houses,
antidiscrimination rules that prevent landlords from discriminat-
ing against children, public schooling, and other group-based
laws benefit people who form families. Rules that disadvantage
illegitimate children and that deny testamentary and alimony
"s See Posner, Legal Regulation of Religious Groups (cited in note 143).
'9 I concentrate on nuclear families; however, "personal networks," consisting both of
kin and non-kin, are also solidary groups that perform similar functions and encounter
similar problems. See generally Claude S. Fischer, To Dwell Among Friends: Personal
Networks in Town and City 5 (Chicago 1982).
'6 Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family 357 (Harvard enlarged ed 1991).
161 See, for example, Maureen M. Black and Izabel B. Ricardo, Drug Use, Drug Traf-
ficking, and Weapon Carrying Among Low-Income, African-American, Early Adolescent
Boys, 93 Pediatrics 1065, 1067-69 (1994) (suggesting that family pressures discourage
some deviant behavior by children); Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory at 595-97
(cited in note 12).
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benefits to unwed cohabitants promote the formation of families
by making substitutes less attractive. Arguably, laws against
prostitution, pornography, adultery, and fornication privilege
sexual relations that occur between spouses. In addition, some
group-based laws injure families-most notoriously, the marriage
penalty in the tax code.'62 On the whole, however, group-based
rules in this area appear to increase the cooperation-defection
differential: tax and property benefits increase the value of family
membership, while divorce laws deprive defectors of the ability to
obtain any of these benefits.
Suppose families discourage deviant behavior by children,
poverty among adults, and other forms of disorder more effective-
ly than the state. If group-based rules increase the cooperation-
defection differential at minimal administrative cost, then they
promote efficiency (and, possibly, redistributive goals). By dele-
gating power to families, the state free rides on their more effec-
tive disciplinary powers.
However, group-based rules raise the familiar problem that
not all benefitted groups behave in the manner desired by the
state. Some families do not provide the spouses with insurance
and the children with a proper home life. Instead, one spouse
tyrannizes the other, or either spouse tolerates deviant behavior
from the child. 63 A weak state might tolerate abuses in some
families because it depends heavily on families to maintain order;
a stronger state could use category-based rules and judicial inter-
ference in dispute resolution to address such abuses.
The relevant category-based rules, corresponding to the mu-
tual insurance and child production justifications for supporting
families, are (1) laws that insure adults and (2) laws that provide
benefits for children. Welfare laws, such as general assistance,
AFDC, and foster care programs, spring to mind. By providing
insurance for adults and benefits for their children, these laws
provide a substitute for similar collective goods provided by fami-
lies.
Welfare laws may undermine the family by making
nonfamily life a relatively attractive alternative. Some evidence,
for example, suggests that AFDC has contributed to increased
divorce rates by allowing spouses to rely on state assistance rath-
er than on each other in time of need." Laws prohibiting dis-
26 USC § 1(a)-(d) (1988).
See Black and Ricardo, 93 Pediatrics at 1069 (cited in note 161) (Some adolescents
report that parents tolerate their drug activity.).
"' See, for example, Oliver C. Moles, Marital Dissolution and Public Assistance Pay-
1996]
The University of Chicago Law Review
crimination on the basis of illegitimacy would have a similar
effect. Despair about the effectiveness of welfare laws and the
conviction that families can provide these benefits more effective-
ly doubtless underlie current calls for welfare reform. But it is an
open question whether a reduction in welfare would promote the
solidarity of families and encourage production of the attendant
benefits to their members. Moreover, it is equally uncertain
whether such benefits, if they occurred, would justify the hard-
ships imposed on people who do not belong to solidary and effec-
tive families.
2. Dispute resolution.
If, for example, the state has an interest in promoting the
solidarity of all families, an appropriate rule for deterring defec-
tion is not a no-divorce rule, as one might expect. Like the kye
dispute, one must distinguish between high-value and low-value
defection. The party that wishes to escape the family may be the
opportunist, but equally he or she may not; in the latter case, a
remedy would be justified.
For example, a man may be tempted to marry a woman who
will support him through graduate school, and then abandon her
when he can support himself. Supposing that a court could reli-
ably untangle the equities, a regime that allowed such husbands
to escape sanctions would produce weaker families than a regime
that supplied legal sanctions for such behavior-such as a no-
divorce or alimony law-because the "family" (the wife and chil-
dren, if any) would be unable to deter the husband's behavior
using nonlegal sanctions. Therefore, a no-divorce law or an alimo-
ny law would deter opportunistic marriages and promote more
solidary, though fewer, marriages. 65
ments: Variations among American States, 32 J Soc Issues 87, 97-99 (1976) (finding
correlation between states with higher welfare benefits and states with higher ratios of
separated to married mothers but unsure of direction of causation).
1" Since unmarried cohabitants may have solidarity, the analysis suggests that courts
should intervene to the same extent as they do with more easily recognizable families,
provided that both the indicia of solidarity and equivalent positive externalities are
present. Compare Marvin v Marvin, 18 Cal 3d 660, 134 Cal Rptr 815, 832 (1976)
(Nonmarital partner may create contract and property rights.), with Hewitt v Hewitt, 77
Ill 2d 49, 394 NE2d 1204, 1211 (1979) (Nonmarital partnership lacks legal status.). See
also Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 506 (1977) (striking down single-family
zoning ordinance that defined family in a highly limited way). See generally Mary Ann
Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law, and Family in the United States
and Western Europe 277-84 (Chicago 1989).
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The problem with a no-divorce law is that it still enables the
husband to behave opportunistically within the marriage, for
example, by treating the wife cruelly. By contrast, a no-fault
divorce law that allowed the wife to sue for divorce and receive
alimony would discourage such conduct and, again, promote the
solidarity of marriages.'66 However, a no-fault divorce law with
no alimony requirements would weaken the solidarity of families
by allowing opportunists to escape their obligations. The appro-
priate solution, then, may be no-fault divorce with fault-based
alimony, where "fault" is defined as opportunistic behavior that a
family's ordinary nonlegal sanctions cannot deter. 1
By contrast, the law should not resolve relatively minor
household disputes. These disputes are unlikely to involve high-
stakes opportunism; one expects, moreover, that the spouses and
children can divide responsibilities among themselves more effec-
tively than would the state. Indeed, internal readjustments
would counteract any attempts by the state to regulate the
division of responsibilities in solidary families. This may explain
the historic restrictions on tort and contract suits between family
members.'
If the only purpose of family law were to promote the solidar-
ity of the family, a reluctance to intervene except in extraordi-
nary circumstances would make sense. As in the case of economic
and religious groups, the courts should decline to resolve disputes
whenever the group's nonlegal sanctions adequately deter oppor-
tunistic behavior.
" I have assumed in the examples that the husband has the wealth and power,
although, of course, that is not always true.
" Compare Margaret F. Brinig and Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism,
23 J Legal Stud 869, 892-93 (1994) (supporting fault-based alimony).
"z These restrictions are weaker than they used to be. At common law, spouses could
not sue each other in tort or for breach of contract. W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts 901-02 (West 5th ed 1984); Joseph Warren, Husband's Right to
Wife's Services, 38 Harv L Rev 421, 421-22 (1925). Today, many states still forbid negli-
gence suits between spouses, and others allow them but scrutinize them more carefully
than negligence suits between strangers. See Keeton, et al, Law of Torts at 903-04. In the
contract area, spouses cannot sue each other for breach of contract as easily as strangers
can sue each other. For example, courts often forbid spouses from suing each other over
contracts relating to labor in the home. See, for example, Borelli v Brusseau, 12 Cal App
4th 647, 16 Cal Rptr 2d 16, 20 (1993) (refusing to enforce a promise by one spouse to pay
the other spouse for care during an illness). See also Lenore J. Weitzman, The Marriage
Contract: Spouses, Lovers, and the Law 338-47 (Free Press 1981) (describing traditional
law); Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 Rutgers L Rev 1059,
1071-72 (1988) (Courts generally refuse to enforce provisions in antenuptial agreements
relating to the *structure of the marriage, domestic and sexual obligations within the
marriage, child rearing, and so on.).
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However, if families frequently engage in or tolerate deviant
behavior, the state should intervene in disputes and apply cate-
gory-based rules (or even group-based disadvantages). These
rules, by increasing the cost of nonlegal sanctioning in the family
and by increasing the value of independent action, reduce the
solidarity of families. The trend in favor of such laws-including
no-fault divorce laws, child abuse laws, and spousal abuse
laws-along with the trend toward category-based advantages
mentioned above, may help account for the increase in divorce,
illegitimacy, and other family-related problems over the last
several decades.'69
In a recent article, Carol Rose has argued that women's
propensity to cooperate-either real or perceived-explains the
wealth inequality between men and women. In marriages, the
workplace, and elsewhere, men systematically obtain larger por-
tions of bargaining surpluses, and over time they acquire a larger
share of social wealth.'70
Rose's discussion is useful in two ways. First, by emphasiz-
ing the abusive relations that occur within the family, it reminds
us of the coercive side of solidarity. A state's commitment to the
family, like a commitment to any other solidary group, requires
toleration of a higher level of abusive behavior between group
members than that tolerated between strangers. Judicial inter-
vention might reduce this abuse; but it would also reduce family
solidarity (in the "good" families as well as the "bad" ones) and,
as a result, social wealth. The same can be said for trade groups,
unions, and religious groups. Indeed, the same holds true for the
very groups that Rose proposes women form in order to assist
each other. That is the irony: these groups, to the extent they are
truly solidary, provide the same opportunities for abuse as fami-
lies. 17 1
Second, Rose's proposal that women form solidary groups
notes, but understates, the difficulties of group formation. Her
use of immigrant groups as an analogy is illustrative. 2 Immi-
grants have been successful at forming solidary institutions, like
"' See Becker, Treatise on the Family at 356-61 (cited in note 160). See also Mary
Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 Va L Rev 663,
711-15 (1976); Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity at 57-58 (cited in note 12).
171 See Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 Va L Rev
421, 441 (1992).
171 Id at 457. Rose acknowledges the importance of discipline and thus the possibility
of abuse.
12 Id at 455.
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the kye, not only because they are victims of discrimination but
also because they live close together, know each other well, inter-
act frequently, share cultural backgrounds, jointly suffer (in some
cases) from ignorance of the dominant language, and so on. Even
if women have a "taste for cooperation," there are few comparable
situational factors that would naturally lead them to form soli-
dary groups.'73 Indeed, because the members of successful all-
male immigrant institutions presumably lack this taste, other
factors, unrelated to sex, must account for their solidarity.
3. A note on families and contract law.
If the courts seek to promote family solidarity, they should
not punish low-stakes opportunism, including low-value,
intrafamily torts or breaches of contracts. Because historically
(and, to a lesser extent, currently) courts have considered the
family protected by public policy, their doctrines should, and, to
some extent do, reflect this policy.
I have already mentioned the laws on interspousal immuni-
ty.74 Consider also the courts' reluctance to enforce gratuitous
promises. If one assumes that people give gifts in order to make
the recipients better off, then legal enforcement would improve
both parties' positions without harming anyone. If courts enforce
a gratuitous promise, the donee can more easily plan around it
and the donor can confer additional value-in the form of cer-
tainty--on the donee. Thus, judicial reluctance to enforce gratu-
itous promises has puzzled commentators.'75
If we assume that unenforced gratuitous promises are gener-
ally made within solidary groups (such as families), as opposed to
between strangers, then the theory advanced here may offer a
solution to this problem. As I have discussed, the family's nonle-
gal sanctions deter opportunism more effectively than do legal
sanctions. If judges enforced intrafamily promises, they would
overlay the nonlegal sanctions with legal sanctions, and substi-
tute their relative ignorance for the family's informational advan-
tages, thus preventing optimal gift-giving behavior.76 Because
7 Id at 426.
174 See note 168 and accompanying text.
"7' See Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J Legal Stud 39, 64-65
(1992) (supporting enforcement); Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and
Deferred Gifts, 20 J Legal Stud 401, 419 (1991) (same). But see Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
Donative Promises, 47 U Chi L Rev 1, 32 (1979) (supporting enforcement where promise is
formal and reliance has occurred).
176 See Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of
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the family can more easily evaluate excuses for not honoring a
promised gift (such as financial misfortune) than can a judge,
and can also impose sanctions more effectively, routine judicial
intervention would increase the value of defection while reducing
the value of the collective good.
However, judicial intervention under unusual conditions may
be justified. For example, courts intervene when the donor dies
unexpectedly and the executor refuses to fulfill a gratuitous
promise." Because death is a contingency that removes the
force of nonlegal sanctions, it justifies legal intervention. Courts
are also more willing to intervene and enforce donative promises
that do not occur within a solidary group, such as donative
promises to charities and other strangers, than they are those
between relatives.78
Like the reluctance to enforce gratuitous promises, courts'
reluctance to enforce contracts with minors has encountered a
great deal of criticism. Writers have criticized the capacity doc-
trine, under which minors often are not bound to contracts they
enter, on the grounds that (1) it is arbitrary because it prevents
courts from evaluating on a case-by-case basis, as they do with
adults, whether a particular minor is incompetent; (2) it unfairly
injures people who reasonably assume that a contracting partner
is an adult; and (3) it injures minors by discouraging people from
contracting with them. Conventional defenses appeal to the rule-
versus-standard catechism as a response to (1), and express the
usual regrets with respect to (2) and (3).179 Most modern commen-
tators, however, agree that the doctrine is indefensible. 8 '
The model reveals the rationality of the capacity doctrine.
The doctrine reduces the payoff to minors from defection (by
the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L J 1261, 1322 (1980) (Nonlegal sanctions may justify
nonenforcement of gratuitous promises.).
.. See, for example, Hamer v Sidway, 124 NY 538, 27 NE 256, 259 (1891) (uncle's
gratuitous promise enforced after his death); Ricketts v Scothorn, 57 Neb 51, 77 NW 365,
367 (1898) (grandfather's gratuitous promise enforced after his death). Writers often inter-
pret these and similar cases to mean that an element of reliance is necessary to render a
gratuitous promise enforceable. However, on my analysis, reliance is unimportant. Com-
pare Shavell, 20 J Legal Stud at 419-20 (cited in note 175) (opposing the reliance require-
ment).
17 See, for example, Allegheny College v National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 NY
369, 159 NE 173, 177 (1927) (Cardozo) (enforcing gratuitous promise to charity).
" See Robert G. Edge, Voidability of Minors' Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine in a Mod-
ern Economy, 1 Ga L Rev 205, 222-27 (1967) (describing and criticizing the conventional
defenses of the infancy doctrine).
" See, for example, E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 4.3 at 378
(Little, Brown 1990).
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limiting their ability to enter into contractual relations outside
the family) without also reducing the value of remaining in the
family. The increase in the cooperation-defection differential
discourages minors from leaving the family, and thus produces
more solidary families.' 8 ' On this theory, the fact that the ca-
pacity doctrine discourages people from contracting with minors
is a virtue, not a cause of regret.
Concerns about maintaining the family and similar solidary
groups doubtless account for other divergences in contract law
from the principle that courts should enforce all voluntary con-
tracts; however, these concerns lie beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. 182
CONCLUSION
The legal analyst ignores norms and nonlegal sanctions at
his peril. A focus on the interaction between law and nonlegal
sanctions shows how nonlegal sanctions in particular, and group
action in general, subvert and transform legal regulation of be-
havior. But if the existence of solidary groups complicates the
state's attempts to regulate behavior, it also presents the state
with opportunities. Solidary groups supply collective goods that
people otherwise demand from the state. Through policies of
selective support, the state can effect increases in the supply of
these goods more cheaply than it could supply them itself
through direct or category-based regulation. In fact, everywhere
one looks in the law, one finds rules concerning the promotion,
exploitation, and suppression of groups, rather than the exclusive
concern with individual action predicted by conventional liberal-
economic analysis."
"' Attempts in the case law to rationalize the capacity doctrine along conventional
lines are unconvincing. See, for example, Halbman v Lemke, 99 Wis 2d 241, 298 NW2d
562, 564 (1980) ("Although the origins of the doctrine are somewhat obscure, it is general-
ly recognized that its purpose is the protection of minors from foolishly squandering their
wealth through improvident contracts with crafty adults who would take advantage of
them in the marketplace."). In support of my theory, see Webster Street Partnership, Ltd.
v Sheridan, 220 Neb 9, 368 NW2d 439, 443 (1985) ("If, indeed, landlords may not contract
with minors, except at their peril, they may refuse to do so. In that event, minors who
voluntarily leave home but who are free to return will be compelled to return to their
parents' home-a result which is desirable.").
'" It is interesting to note that the equitable predecessors to the unconscionability
doctrine and similar contract and consumer protection rules emerged from a policy pur-
sued by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century equity courts of protecting landed families
from dissipation of their wealth by expectant heirs. See the discussion in Posner, 24 J
Legal Stud at 314-16 (cited in note 44).
" Other applications include American Indian law, see Canby, American Indian Law
1996]
The University of Chicago Law Review
A thorough understanding of this behavior requires one to
shake off what I called the "insulation theory" of nonlegal sanc-
tions. This theory implies that legal analysts can ignore nonlegal
sanctions because they have uniform and predictable effects. If
an analysis, for example, suggests that an optimal law is X, and
it is pointed out that sometimes X would be applied to people
heavily deterred by nonlegal sanctions from engaging in the be-
havior promoted by X, while sometimes X would be applied to
people who are not influenced by nonlegal sanctions, the analyst
would reply that the legal sanctions should be stricter in the first
case than in the second."8 Only this view explains why most
commentators concede the importance of nonlegal sanctions but
conduct their legal analyses as though such sanctions did not
exist.
In fact, nonlegal sanctions complicate legal analysis consider-
ably. Application of the same law X to an atomistic collection of
people, A, and a solidary group of people, B, can produce dramat-
ically different effects. It might, as the examples of welfare law,
antidiscrimination law, and employment law show, make the
people in A wealthier while making the people in B poorer. It
might, as the discussion of dispute resolution shows, reduce the
number of disputes that arise in A while increasing the number
of disputes arising in B. In short, it might encourage people in A
to engage in the desired behavior while discouraging people in B.
Legal analysts and judges must pay closer attention to the socio-
logical contexts to which their analyses apply."5
in a Nutshell at 3-6 (cited in note 80); the law of nonprofit organizations, see Henry B.
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L J 835, 894 (1980); the law of
worker ownership, see Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs,
Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 Yale L J 1749, 1809-10 (1990);
and the law governing political parties and organizations--for which, however, a sizable
literature already exists, see, for example, Wilson, Political Organizations at 337-40 (cited
in note 69).
" Conversely, if the nonlegal sanctions independently promote behavior consistent
with X, then the analyst would advocate weaker sanctions for the people influenced by the
nonlegal sanctions.
" An interesting illustration of such attention is State v Lentz, 70 Ohio St 3d 527,
639 NE2d 784 (1994). In that case, the court said that, although one cannot expect a pri-
vate lawyer to assert the incompetence of an officemate in order to obtain a reversal of a
conviction, a public defender can be expected to assert the incompetence of another public
defender in the same office. Therefore, a criminal defendant may be barred by res judicata
from asserting a new claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the second case, but not
in the first. Id at 785. The majority based this distinction on the profit motive of the
private firm. Id at 786. The dissent, on the other hand, pointed out that the nonlegal
sanctions in a public defender's office provide as strong an incentive not to expose a
colleague's incompetence as does the profit motive in the firm. Id at 787 (Wright dissent-
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This discussion resonates with other debates in social and
legal theory. For instance, others have argued that self-regulat-
ing groups must be contrasted with the market and the state to
determine the optimal means of social organization. They have
pointed out that when the market supplies goods efficiently or
the state supplies goods efficiently, solidary groups are injured
because members can obtain the goods supplied by the groups
from the market or the state.'86 Writers have addressed the po-
tential efficiency losses resulting from substitution of market and
state mechanisms for group mechanisms." 7 They have not,
however, adequately addressed the ways in which the state can
use legal means to protect and exploit the efficiency-enhancing
aspects of solidary groups. Nor have they addressed the ways in
which existing law responds to or neglects these phenomena.
The conventional, superficial understanding of the interac-
tion between legal and nonlegal sanctions has marred several
lines of analysis. First, a naive view of the state's ability to pro-
mote groups underlies the various proposals for using groups to
solve social problems. I have discussed Rose's women's
groups."S Others have pushed groups to the forefront of discus-
sions on race relations,' and, of course, the group is an impor-
tant theme in discussions of labor and interpersonal rela-
tions.19 None of these discussions, however, takes sufficient ac-
count of the complexities of group behavior.
Second, arguments about market failures and other sorts of
problems routinely assume that the state should intervene in a
direct way, that is, with category-based rules and intrusive dis-
pute resolution rules. An example is Cass Sunstein's argument
that addiction, myopia, sour grapes, lack of information, and
ing).
" See, for example, Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity at 48 (cited in note 12);
Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation 132-40 (Wiley 1976).
,87 Recent contributions to the literature on the private provision of public goods have
discussed this problem. See, for example, Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, 29 J Pub Econ
at 46-47 (cited in note 43). See also Robert P. Inman, Markets, Governments, and the
'New" Political Economy, in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, eds, 2 Handbook of
Public Economics 647, 692 (North Holland 1987).
"8 See Rose, 78 Va L Rev at 455-58 (cited in note 170). See also text accompanying
notes 170-73.
" See, for example, Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic
Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive
Racial Justice, 107 Harv L Rev 1463, 1544 (1994).
... Summers, 141 U Pa L Rev at 537-38 (cited in note 135) (labor relations); Robert N.
Bellah, et al, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life 141
(Berkeley 1985) (interpersonal relations).
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other problems relating to the formation of preferences justify
state intervention.19' This discussion typifies legal scholarship
in that it compares state intervention and the market, without
considering the possibility of delegating power to groups. But for
the subtle and information-sensitive task of transforming the
preferences of people suffering from addiction, myopia, sour
grapes, and lack of information, subsidization of certain groups
that attack these problems-especially, families and religious
groups-is a plausible and perhaps superior alternative to state
regulation.
Third, philosophical debates about the role of the state and
the roles of groups in political life often neglect the legal implica-
tions of state control of groups. In recent arguments between
liberals and communitarians, for example, the concept of the
group has played a surprisingly minor role.'92 On the one hand,
for the communitarians, a great deal turns on the extent to
which groups solve the problems supposedly produced by the
liberal state.'93  On the other hand, neither liberals nor
communitarians say much about how groups work and how the
state can or cannot encourage or suppress groups.' The argu-
ment proceeds at a high level of abstraction. But political ideals
must eventually be grounded in legal possibility. What is needed,
' See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U Chi L Rev
1129, 1158-73 (1986).
" See, for example, Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale L J 1493
(1988). Several contributors address autonomous groups, pointing out their benefits (po-
litical participation) and their dangers (coercion, faction). See, for example, Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L J 1493, 1531-32 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L J 1539, 1572-76 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow
Republicanism, 97 Yale L J 1713, 1722-23 (1988) (pointing out ambiguities in Michelman's
and Sunstein's positions with respect to groups). For a general critique from a political
party perspective, see Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective
on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U Pa L Rev 1567 (1988).
193 However, communitarians are obscure about how and whether the state should
support groups. Nothing in communitarianism suggests that all groups are good, or that
the state should indiscriminately support all groups. For a discussion of these problems,
see Hardin, One for All at 183-86 (cited in note 12). Still, political and social theorists
have made powerful arguments that the effectiveness of political and economic institu-
tions depends heavily on civil society. See especially Robert D. Putnam, Making Democra-
y Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy 171-76 (Princeton 1993). This suggests that the
use of laws in a manner that is sensitive to the solidarity of groups has a powerful prag-
matic justification.
' On liberals' neglect of groups, see, for example, Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual,
the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory, 29 World Pol 343, 346-49 (1977)
(discussing Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau). See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Con-
tract 73 (Penguin 1968) (Maurice Cranston, trans) ("[I]f the general will is to be clearly ex-
pressed, it is imperative that there should be no sectional associations in the state . . ").
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but what has been lacking in debates between liberals and
communitarians, is a systematic analysis of how the state can
use laws to deal with groups, so that the prescriptions of philoso-
phy reflect an adequate understanding of the limitations of the
law.

